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The Common Agricultural 
Policy 
Agricultural commodities and processed foods are a 
group of products which are of particular concern to 
developing  countries  because  it  is  often  the  case 
(a)  that.  they  are  at  their  most  competitive  in  the 
productiOn of such goods,  which use  a great deal of 
lab?ur but do not require large quantities of  expensive 
captt~l. a~d (b), that such goods can provide the best 
contnbutton to development in rural areas where the 
problems of unemployment and poverty are at their 
most acute. With this in mind we need to examine the 
agricultural policy of  the EEC and its effect on markets 
for developing country exports. 
!he Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) came into 
~emg  as a ~onsequence of two main pressures operat-
mg at the tlme of the formation of the Community. In 
the first place,  harmonisation of food prices and the 
free  ~ovement ?f food through the Community were 
essential to the Idea of a common market. Failure to 
a?hie~e such har~o~isation would have meant widely 
diffenng food pnces m the separate member countries 
beca~se  national  agricultural  policies  had  varied 
considerably before the Treaty of Rome. This in turn 
w.ould  have  i~plied  varying  wage  costs  between 
di~erent  co~mtnes which would have seriously under-
mmed the aim of  free. trade in manufactures. Secondly, 
all  European countnes had a  'farm problem' in the 
sense  that the majority of the rural population were 
pea~ant farmers. working. small and inefficient holdings 
for mcomes which steadily fell  behind those obtained 
in the industrial sectors of each country. 
The  aims  of  the  CAP  were  thus  to  guarantee 
European. farmers  a  fair  income  in  comparison  to 
non-farm mcomes, and to harmonise prices. Unfortu-
nately for outside suppliers of foodstuffs to the Com-
munity,  the  method  chosen  to  achieve  both  these 
objectives  was  to  set common prices  at a  level  well 
above  those  ruling  on  world  markets  at the  time 
backed up by a system of  variable import levies so that 
suppliers from outside could not undercut or compete 
with the chosen internal price level. 
Regulations  under  the  policy  were  established 
between 1965 and 1970 for all cereals (including rice 
which was grown. inefficiently in a small area of Italy); 
all  meat  (e~cludmg mutton  and lamb);  eggs;  dairy 
products; mlseeds and vegetables. The mechanism for 
regulating each product is  essentially the same.  Each 
year a de.sired  i~te~nal price level is agreed, called the 
target pnce. Th1s  IS  supported internally by an inter-
ve~tion price, about 7 per cent below the target price. 
If  mternal  p~i~es fall to the interve_ntion level govern-
ment authonties must buy all supphes coming onto the 
market  at that price.  The  target  price  is  supported 
ex~ernal_ly by a threshold price (which equals the target 
pn?e n:tmus  th~ ~ost of  t~ansport to internal markets) 
whtch IS the mimmum pnce at which outside suppliers 
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can enter the Community. Any difference between the 
world price and the threshold price is  collected as  a 
variable  levy  (variable  so  that it always  adjusts  for 
changes  in the  world prices).  In order to get  rid of 
surplus  supplies  at times  of over-production  export 
subsidies are  also  provided so  that surpluses  can be 
sold on the world markets at world prices. 
When world prices are low,  the Common Agricul-
~ural  Policy  has  u1!desirable  consequences,  both 
~ntern~lly,  and .  parti~ularly  for  outside  suppliers, 
mcludmg potential Third World exporters of agricul-
tural products. Internally, if prices are too high home 
production  increas~s rapidly so  that the Community 
becomes  self-sufficient  m  one  or more commodities. 
But  the  process  does  not  always  stop  there:  self-
sufficiency  may  turn into  over-production,  and then 
surpluses must be exported at great cost to Community 
tax-payers - unwanted surpluses of butter were  sold 
cheaply to Russia in 1973, for example. 
In such a situation of internal prices, high relative to 
world levels, the effect of  CAP is to diminish the size of 
the  mar~et available for outside suppliers as internal 
pr~ductton expands. Products of particular interest to 
Third World exporters which  have  in the past been 
affected  in  this  way  are  sugar,  rice  beef  tobacco 
oilseeds,  fruit and vegetables.  Canned and'  processed 
foo~s are also adversely affected by CAP regulations -
for mstance, exporters of  tinned fruit to the EEC must 
pay a levy on the sugar content of the tin as well as a 
normal CET duty on canned foods. It is also CAP and 
its  suppo_r~ers which have made sure that agricultural 
commodities are excluded from special trade arrange-
ments like Association. Table 3 shows how far above 
world  prices  Community  prices  for  some  products 
were in the 1971/72 crop year. 
Table 3 
World  Minimum import 
price at  price into the  Community 
Product  Community  Community  price as a 
ports  (Threshold price)  %above 
£per ton  £per ton  world price 
Wheat  22·8  47·7  109 
Barley  23·2  42·9  185 
Maize  23·6  41·5  76 
Rice  43·3  88·5  105 
White 
Sugar  66·7  96·5  45 
Beef  228·8  304·8  33 
Eggs  169·4  274·4  62 
Butter  478·4  829·0  72 
Source:  European  Communities  Yearbook  of Agricul-
tural Statistics 1970 and 1972. 
A  very  s?bstantial  increase  in  the  world  price  of 
foodstuffs smce late  1972 has created a new  situation 
in  which  Community  prices  are  now  below  world prices for a number of products. For example, wheat 
has risen to between £60 and £70 a ton; barley £50 to 
£60 a ton; sugar up to £200 a ton; and rice up to £85 
per  ton.  These  increases  have  resulted  in  the  CAP 
operating in  reverse,  to keep  internal  prices  down. 
Nevertheless the conclusions which have been drawn 
about  the  effect  of the  policy  remain  unaltered  in 
respect  of the  period between  1965  and  1972  when 
CAP  prices  were  considerably  above  world  levels. 
There  is  no  certainty  how  long  world  prices  will 
continue at current levels,  and in the event  of a fall 
the policy will once more have the same consequences. 
An  important example  of the  way  in  which  the 
effects of CAP differ from alternative possible agricul-
tural policies, whatever the level of world prices, is the 
special case of  sugar. Britain has traditionally restricted 
its own production of sugar from beet to about one 
third of  total requirements by acreage quotas, keeping 
two  thirds  (1·8  million  tons)  available  for  outside 
suppliers under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. 
By contrast the EEC was already self-sufficient at the 
start of  its sugar policy in 1968, and under the stimulus 
of high CAP prices has since moved into a surplus of 
roughly 1 million tons.  1·4 million tons of the Com-
monwealth  Sugar  Agreement  come  from  seven 
developing countries which depend on the export of 
cane sugar for most of  their foreign exchange revenues, 
employment,  and  resources  for  development.  (The 
countries  concerned  are  Barbados,  Fiji,  Guyana, 
Jamaica,  Mauritius,  Swaziland,  and  Trinidad:  the 
value  of their  sugar  exported  to  the  UK was  £62 
million in 1972). Under the terms of UK entry to the 
EEC  the  Commonwealth  Sugar  Agreement  expires 
at the end of 1974. Unless it is extended or replaced by 
a new agreement,  these countries will  lose  their UK 
sugar market to the surplus being generated in the six. 
In general it must be stated that there are a number 
of potential  ways  of safeguarding  the  interests  of 
farmers in developed countries other than the parti-
cular methods adopted by CAP. In Britain there was a 
policy  of  subsidies  by  product  (called  deficiency 
payments),  allied  with  grants  to  make  farms  more 
efficient  - consumers  paid world  prices,  and supply 
did not expand very much (or was  restricted so that 
outside  suppliers  kept a  guaranteed  market).  In the 
United States large acreages were taken out of  produc-
tion when over-supply occurred. 
The European Generalised 
Schemes of Preference (GSP) 
The principle of Generalised Schemes of Preference 
(  GSP),  in  which  all  countries  were  to  offer  poor 
countries  preferential  access  for  their manufactured 
exports, emerged from a resolution passed in the 1968 
meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCT  AD).  The implementation 
of an agreed world-wide scheme was prevented by the 
refusal of the United States to participate, and there-
fore individual developed countries including Britain 
and the EEC separately brought out their own schemes 
in  1970.  The original GSP proposal was for duty-free 
and flexible access to be granted for all manufactured 
products  under  terms  which  would  give  developing 
countries  the  maximum  freedom  to  expand existing 
output and develop new industries. This has turned out 
to be far from the actual outcome, as the EEC scheme 
exemplifies. 
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The European GSP permits duty-free entry for most 
(but not all) manufactures only up to fixed quotas for 
each  product  from  each  exporting  country.  These 
'tariff quotas' are based on past actual imports, so the 
possibility of  starting from scratch is virtually excluded. 
If imports from any country exceed its quota the full 
CET  duty  is  automatically  re-applied.  In  addition 
products are classified  as  'sensitive',  'quasi-sensitive' 
and 'non-sensitive'. For sensitive items not only are the 
basic terms more restrictive, but the Community can 
also suddenly decide to withdraw the preference if it 
judges  that market  disruption  is  being  caused  for 
domestic producers of the same or competing goods. 
Needless to say  the sensitive list includes those very 
products mentioned earlier which are of most interest 
to the poorest developing countries, namely: textiles, 
clothing,  leather goods,  footwear,  carpets,  toys  and 
handicrafts.  Additional  restrictions  applying  to  all 
GSP products are that the annual growth of  the quotas 
were fixed in advance at a low level (5 per cent in the 
original  EEC  scheme)  and  that  all  products  must 
comply with strict 'rules of origin' regulations. 
The original  European scheme  was  in some  ways 
less  generous  than  that implemented  separately  by 
Britain before Accession.  Also  the relatively favour-
able Commonwealth textile quotas will  be lost when 
Britain adopts the EEC scheme. An UNCT  AD study 
of 1973 showed that out of a total of $5,300 million of 
Third World exports in  1970  potentially eligible  for 
GSP schemes (i.e.  dutiable  manufactured  products), 
only $2,100 million (or less than half),  were  actually 
included  in  the  GSPs  which  actually  emerged.  See 
insert The European Community and the Third World 
- 'Recent Developments'. 
Current events of importance 
to the relationship between 
the EEC and developing 
countries 
(a)  The increase in oil prices 
The rise in the international market price of  oil from 
£1·13 per barrel in October 1973 to £3·35 per barrel in 
January 1974 (initiated by the strategy of OPEC - the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) has 
large and widespread implications for world develop-
ment  in  the  next  decade.  The  majority  of non-oil 
producing countries, both developed and developing, 
face massive balance of  payments deficits and inflation 
problems resulting from the increase.  For developed 
market economies as a whole the extra oil import cost 
amounts to about £21,000  million in 1974,  of which 
£13,000 million falls on Western Europe. For develop-
ing countries the cost is  estimated at £5,000 million. 
The  short-term  temptation for  all  countries  is  to 
take actions  which  would make matters worse.  For 
instance,  developed countries are tempted to restrict 
imports of other goods  from  their  neighbours  (and 
from  developing  countries)  and  to  devalue  their 
currencies in order to try and cancel out their indivi-
dual  national deficits.  Such  actions  would  have  the 
effect  of creating  a  downward  spiral  in  economic 
activity  leading  towards  a  major  world  depression, 
and meanwhile  the underlying problem - the deficit 
with  the  oil  producing  countries  - would  remain 
unsolved.  Developing  countries  face  a  particularly 
acute problem because their ability to borrow money is i 
i 
t 
~ 
extremely limited compared with developed countries 
and because for some of  them the increase in oil prices 
has come on top of  increased prices for imports of  food 
and other goods required for their development plans. 
India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are the most seriously 
affected on all these counts. India, for instance, will be 
paying £330 million more for her oil in 1974 compared 
to 1973,  an amount equivalent to 30 per cent of her 
total export earnings and half her accumulated foreign 
exchange  reserves.  {In  addition  India  has  already 
experienced serious difficulties in paying for food and 
raw  materials imports in recent years;  and because 
fertilisers  are  manufactured  directly  from  oil  by-
products, her own food production will suffer through 
inability  to  afford  the  import  or  manufacture  of 
fertilisers.) 
Solutions to these problems are not easily worked 
out.  Much depends on the use to which the surplus 
tion of  indecision, the greatest danger is that the funds 
will  be  made available  too late  to prevent a  severe 
breakdown of economic progress  in those countries 
most seriously  affected  - in which  case  the  task of 
getting back on an upward growth path will be more 
difficult and more expensive. 
(b)  The  drought  in the  Sahelian  countries  of West 
Africa 
Six  countries  in  West  Africa  bordering  on  the 
southern edge of the Sahara desert (an area known as 
the Sahel) have been suffering increasing and serious 
problems  of drought and widespread  famine  in the 
last  five  years  due  to  the  advance  of the  Sahara 
southwards. This phenomenon has itself resulted from 
successive failure of rains, soil erosion caused by too 
intensive cultivation and grazing, and deforestation in 
the  area.  The countries  concerned  are amongst the 
poorest in the world, and are therefore least able to 
GENERAL SUMMARY OF TRADE FIGURES 
Exports from developing countries to the main industrialised countries 1966 and 1971. 
EEC and UK 
TOTAL  Centrally  £million  As a% of 
EXPORTS  USA  Planned  Japan  EEC  UK  Value  total Third 
TO WORLD  Economies  (Six)  World Exports 
1966  16,140  3,090  975  1,355  3,930  1,635  5,565  34·5% 
1971  25,800  4,660  1,320  2,910  6,360  2,340  8,700  33·7% 
Annual % Increase  12%  10%  7%  23%  12%  9%  11% 
Exports from the EEC* to developing countries 1966 and 1971. 
£million  EEC Exports 
USA  Total  to Third World 
EEC Total  EEC Exports  Exports  Developed  as  %of Total 
Exports to  EEC Exports  to Third World  to Third  Country  Developed 
World  to Third  as  % ofTotal  World**  Exports to  Country 
World  Exports  Third World  Exports to 
Third World 
1966  27,820  4,750  17%  4,160  12,310  39% 
1971  51,350  7,530  15%  5,530  19,960  38% 
Annual % Increase  17%  12%  7%  12% 
* Old EEC (Six) and UK. 
**  America is the second largest supplier of goods to the Third World. 
funds (estimated to be £15,000 million by the end of 
1974) of the Arab oil producers are put. The United 
Nations has  been trying to create a  special  fund  of 
some £1,250 million for emergency relief for the most 
seriously  affected  developing  countries,  of  which 
contributions of £210 million each would come from 
USA, Europe, and other industrialised countries, and 
£625  million would come from the oil producers. At 
the time of writing it is uncertain whether this figure 
will  be  achieved;  and meanwhile  several  of the  oil 
producers  have  expressed  their  own  plans  for  the 
creation of an Arab Development Bank, and Iran has 
announced its intention of directing special funds to 
the  International  Monetary  Fund  for  concessional 
loans to developing countries.  In this complex situa-
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cope  with  the  tremendous  problems  of hunger  and 
malnutrition being caused.  6 The European Community 
has done much to try and alleviate this problem both 
by  contributing  to  the  United  Nations  Food  Aid 
programme and by making grants available from the 
European  Development  Fund (£9  million  in  1973). 
The Commission has proposed further and increased 
help in  1974,  amounting to £18  million in Food Aid 
and £16 million in Financial Aid from the EDF. This 
is  an example of a situation of extreme difficulty and 
poverty in which Europe has  responded quite gene-
rously in attempts to alleviate the problem. 
6  Chad,  Mali,  Niger,  Upper Volta,  Mauritania, and Senegal:  average  annual 
incomes ranging from £30 to £70 per capita with the exception of Senegal - £100 
per capita. Conclusions and policies for 
the future 
If the discussion in this paper has appeared at times 
critical of European efforts towards the Third World, 
it is because major changes in the attitudes of rich and 
fortunate countries are required if  any progress is to be 
made in halting the increasing inequality and poverty 
which characterises world development in this decade. 
In  all  fairness,  Europe's  record  in  relations  with 
developing countries is much better than that of either 
the USA or the Eastern bloc.  But this does not give 
grounds for  complacency  - there  is  still  much  the 
Community can achieve. 
The  shortcomings  of  Europe's  current  policies 
towards  the  Third  World  may  be  conveniently 
summarised under three headings: 
(a)  Pressures from declining or inefficient domestic 
industries  which  cause  discrimination  between 
commodities  (agriculture  versus  manufactures, 
sensitive items versus non-sensitive items). 
(b)  The apparent failure of politicians to realise that 
the very sound arguments for mutual gains from 
free  trade  can  be  extended  beyond  the  Com-
munity itself. 
(c)  The  discriminatory  nature  of current  schemes 
between  countries  (Associates  versus  the  rest 
of the Third World). 
The most difficult  question  is  that of pressure  and 
political  lobbying  from  traditional  and  declining 
industries  of the  Community for protection against 
imports,  so  that  they  can  continue  their  inefficient 
operation.  This  is  the  case  of agriculture,  textiles, 
footwear and similar industries which face competition 
from the now more efficient and cheap producers of 
the Third World. The answer here is for a comprehen-
sive  policy of 'adjustment assistance'  to compensate 
people  in  such  industries  with  re-training  schemes, 
retirement grants, and the creation of  alternative jobs. 
Britain carried out such a  scheme quite successfully 
with its declining cotton industry, and there are few 
reasons  why  such  a  policy  should  not  be  equally 
successful in other cases. 
To the second heading all  that needs to be added 
to what has already been said is that for every pound's 
worth of imports that Europe agrees to buy from a 
developing country, it is more than likely to be able to 
sell  a  pound's worth in return.  And this  process  is 
cumulative, because when developing countries really 
get moving they will  require increasing quantities of 
goods from Europe. The argument made sometimes 
that entry for developing countries' products worsens 
balance  of payments  problems  in  Europe has  little 
factual  basis.  The  latter  problems  derive  almost 
exclusively from import and export imbalances in trade 
amongst  developed  countries  themselves  or  (since 
autumn  1973)  with  the  Middle-East  oil  producing 
countries. 
Regarding  the  third  point  (the  divisive  effect  of 
Association),  the discrimination amongst developing 
countries embodied in the policy of Association has 
serious consequences for the ability of Third World 
countries to take joint action in international negotia-
tions with rich countries. 
Europe should proceed to make non-discriminatory 
trade agreements with any Third World country which 
approaches  with  the  elements  of a  mutually  satis-
factory  trading relationship.  It has  in fact,  recently 
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made an agreement with one of the poorest countries 
of the world which had been excluded from current 
policies: India. This broadening of Community policy 
should be resolutely pursued. 
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Notes on table: 
(a)  Estimate from Botswana Meat Commission 
Report. 
(b) 1965-66 two-year average. 
(c)  Estimated from sugar reports. 
(d) Information on Lesotho and Tonga not 
available. 
KEY 
Agricultural 
exports as %  of 
total exports 
Most important 
agricultural 
export as a % of 
agric. exports. 
*  Ten of the sixteen countries for which figures are available are more than 50% dependent 
on agricultural exports for their export earnings, and for twelve countries the chief agricultural 
export is in direct conflict with European production under the Common Agricultural Policy 
(sugar, tobacco, oilseeds, and  beef). 
Gambia (b)  Sierra Leone  Nigeria 
,_......;;;...._"'T'"" __  ---.  Tanzania  Uganda  Kenya  Malawi 
97.2  Oilseeds  13.5  Oilseeds  41.3  Cocoa 
and veg.  55.5  38.0 
oils 
99.0 
Ghana 
75.9  Cocoa 
79.2 
Zambia 
0.7 
Botswana (a) 
90.0  Beef 
70.0 
PACIFIC 
Fiji 
72.7  Sugar 
74.3 
CARIBBEAN 
Barbados 
78.0  S~gar 
68.8 
W. Samoa 
n.a.  Copra 
n.a. 
Guyana (c)  Jamaica 
35.0  Sugar  25.5  Sugar 
80.5  49.2 
75.3  Coffee 
21.0 
Trinidad 
8.8  Sugar 
58.4 
83.5  Coffee 
60.0 
57.5  Coffee 
33.0 
89.0  Tobacco 
48.9 
Swaziland (c) 
n.a.  Sugar 
50.0 
Mauritius 
95.8  Sugar 
95.7 THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE THIRD WORLD: 
Recent Developments 
New EEC policies 
for associates 
AT  THE  END  of  much  hard their  products  tn  Europe 
bargaining  and  cliffhanging  in whether  or  not  these  products 
the  Jamaican  capital  last week  clash  with  those  'items  'Which 
the  developing  countries  of  are  produced  in  Europe  and 
Africa,  the  Caribbean  and  the  covered by the Common A,gricul-
Pacific  came  to  a  .  reasonably  tural  Policy.  In  this  context 
good  agreement with  the  Nine  it  will  be  very  difficult  for 
on  the .way  forwar.d  ~o a  n.ew  Britain's partners to  renege on 
convention of association which  the  understanding  that  Com-
is  due  to  go  into  effect  on  monwealth  sugar  producers 
February 1. At the end of Janu- should  be  allowed  to  sell  1.4m. 
ary  the  Yaou~de  and  Arusha  tonnes  of  sugar a  year to  the 
a.greements which regulate rela- Nine.  If they are  determined 
tions .between. much of  French- the  ACP  negotiators  will  be 
spe~kmg Africa .  and  the  East  able  to  sweep  aside  many  of 
African Commumty on the one  the  non-tariff  barriers  and 
han~ and  th~ EEC on th:e  other  excessively  stringent  rules  of 
~xpire  ..  Besides pro.longmg  a~d origin  which  have  hitherto 
1mprovmg  the  tradmg  and  aid  blocked  their export growth  in 
relationships  established  u~~er Europe.  European  consumers 
Yaounde  and  Arusha  the  w  of  a.  wid  range of goods  from 
agreement  must  take  account  .  e 
1 
of the aspirations of other Com- ~ll:lmma  to  sweetened  o:aD:ge 
monwealth  Mrican  countries  J~Ice could .be  th~  b~nefictar1es 
and  the newly  emerging  states  0  s~ch  hberahs~tton.  I 
of the West Indies and Oceania.  It IS  howeve~ ~1th Europe s 
new offer of a limited guarantee 
to stabilise the export earnings 
Details  of  the  ACP  countries  from  a 
As  a  result  of  the  delibera- range of export products - raw 
tions  of  ministers  in  Kingston  materials,  semi-manufactures 
the  technicians  of  the  ACP  and  manufactures-that  much 
group  and  the  European  Com- new  ground  ha~  bee.n  b~oken. 
mqnity will meet in Brussels fn  For  t.~e  first  ~Ime  m  history 
September charged with tbe job  a  maJor  trading:.  g~oup  ~as 
of working out the details of the  undertake~ to assist  m  halt~ng 
·  ·  t  t  b  the  nd  of  the  erosion  of  developmg  s: 
new  ms rumen.  Y - e  countries'  purchasing  power .9 
November.  This  then .~ust J:>e  which  results  from  periodic  .~ 
appr?ved by  anoth~r ~Ims~enal sharp· falls in commodity prices E 
meetmg  before  It  JS  signed or  the  ineKorably  increasing· ~ 
finally. at the end ?f the year or prices  of  industrial  goods  that £ 
earl.Y  m  January IIi  Lome,  the the  poorer  countries  have  to  '0;11 
capital of Togo.  import.  ACP  countries  which  ~ 
The guidelines set out by the  are  squeezed  in  this  way  will c 
ministers  for  them  _last  week  be  entitled  to  special  financial  ~ 
fall under three headmgs; trade assistance.  ~ 
cooperation,  export  earnings C  h 
and  industrial  cooperation.  The  oncern  ] 
concept of industrial cooperation  The  assistance  is  likely  to  ~ 
is  the least detailed but if it is  have  a  firmly  fixed  ceiling g 
imagin.~tively  handled  could  placed  on  it  and  will  not  take  ~ 
produce  a  growth  of  new  into account the problems faced  .2! 
industry· in  much  of  the Third  by ACP countries in the form of  h 
World under the aegis of Euro- sharply  increased  oil  prices  E 
pean  manufacturers.  That which  are not Europe's respon- ,g 
could  present opportunities for sibility.  Nevertheless  it  is  a  ~ 
both sides. On trade cooperation  promising  new  initiativ~  whi~h  ~ 
the  Nine  have  conceded  that will manifest the Nine's concern  'g 
the  ACP  countries  must  be for a  large part of the develop- !5, 
given  much  freer  access  for  ing world.  ~ 
EEC agrees t 
with associabl 
BY  HUGH  O'SHAUGHNESSY 
THE  AFRICAN,  Caribbean  and 
Pacific  countries  (ACP)  and  the 
EEC  yesterday  agreed  on 
sketchy  political  guidelines  for 
the  elaboration  of  a  new  con-
vention  of  association  to  come 
into  force  on  February  1. 
Agreement  was  reached  after 
late  night  discussiOns  between 
ministers  of  the  ACP  and  EEC 
s:  which  dragged  on  till  3.25  a.m. 
.9  yesterday  morning.  In  their 
.;  communique  the  ministers 
has committed itself 
account " the deten01 
terms of trade bctwe 
country  concerned 
Community "  in  w 
sums  to  be  paid  o 
EEC.  This is seen a 
taking by the Europe 
pensate  the ACP  cor 
those  rises  in the pri 
that  they  buy  frc 
which  are  attrit 
Europe's  own  inf:la1 
countries  which  rec 
under the new scben 
required to inform tt 
Commission about ho 
such  money  but no 
ditions  would  attach 
E  declared  that  the  way  was  now 
r..  open for technicians to  work out 
~»  a  final  convention by  the end of 
~  November  at  the  latest.  Both 
.o  sides  hope  to  sign  a  new  agree-
'0:1'  ment which would supersede the 
t-- Yaounde and Arusha agreements 
t-:  and  bring  many  Commonwealth  Rules  of  origh 
ai  countries  into  a  relation  with 
eq  the enlarged Community for the  The  ACP  com: 
;  first time,  in December or Janu·  secured  concessions 
;;;:  ary.  The  Togolese  capital  of  Nine  on  the  difficul 
E::  Lome  is  the  most  likely  venue  plex  question  of  U 
for the signings.  origin  for  ACP  e,xp 
]  The most novel  and significant  Community.  Hitherto 
~  concession  tbat  the  ACP  coun- of.  a  pr~duct  has 
~  ~f~~  m~~:g=~  t~;'cf~~t~~i~tgoft~~~  ~~~Ji~g~li~ :e~:~~ 
the Community should take steps  Will  als.o  be  determ1 
~»  to  guarantee  financially  their  proportJOn  of  v_alue  t;  earnings on  exports to  the  Com- ACPs  are  pressmg  f 
E  munity  arising  not  just  from  be_  t.reated  as  ACP P 
o  primary products  but also  from  m1mmum of 25  per c' 
.!::,  manufactured  and  semi-manu- value has  been addec 
"'  factured goods.  Though the ACP  ACP  country. 
t  group  failed  to  reach  an  all- The  EEC  underto1 
::s  embracing  guarantee  which  mise  obstacles  to  tl 
"'  would  protect  the  real  purchas·  ACP countries arisin~ 
E  ing  power  of  their export  earn- tariff  barriers  withi1 
~  ings  from  the  full  effects  of  munity  and  from  th 
~  world  inflation,  the  Community  Common  Agrieultura 
More help for 
Developing Countri~ 
The European Community has now pror 
its generalised system of preferences (GSl 
The improvement~ include: 
(a)  Processed agricultural products 
The Community\ GSP, which  wa~ 
originally  limited  to  manufac.tured 
goods,  has  been  progre~sively  ex-
tended  to  include  proce~sed agricul-
tural produce. The Commi~sion pro-
poses  both  to  extend  the  li~t  of 
products covered and to  increa~e the 
margin of preference for  mo~t of the 
products  already  covered  by  tbe 
Community  ~cheme.  If  the  Com-
mission's proposals are accepted. the 
volume of trade covered.  which  ' 
approximately £234 million  in  19 
would  rise  to  approximately  L 
million in  1975. 
(b)  Semi-finished  and  manufactu 
industrial products 
The  basic  improvement  propo 
by  the  Commi~sion  concerns 
increase  in  the  /el'e/ of the  'cci/i1 
for  imports  into  the  Commu1 
under  the  GSP.  This  increase 
about  15 °"  results from a  recalc1 
t1on of the ceilings on the basis of 
Reproduced from European Community July/August 1974 by permis~ asis of pact 
e group 
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is  also  expected  to  foster  in-
dustrial  co-operation  with  the 
ACP  group  through  such  means 
as  joint ventures  and the  grant-
ing  of  soft  loans  fo.r  ACP  in· 
du6trialisation. 
The final  complexion of  a  new 
convention  of association will  in 
;::reat  part depend on  the success 
or failure of the ACP  negotiators 
in  pinning  down  firmly  the  con-
cessions  sketched  out  in  yester-
day's  document. 
A  major  battle  will  still 
centre  round  the  actual  amount 
of  aid  which  the  ACPs  will  re-
ceive  though they have  accepted 
there  must  be  a  ceiling  on  the 
guarantee fund the two  sides are 
still wide  apart on  figures.  The 
Community  is  thinking  in  terms 
of  a  total  of  between  3,000m.-
also  4,000m.  units of account over the 
from  the  next  five  years  while  the  ACPs 
and  com- would  like  to  see  a  grand  total 
rules  of  nearer 8,000m.  units  of  account. 
to  the 
origin 
deter-
tariff 
it 
the 
The 
goods  to 
roducts  if a 
nt. of their 
within the 
k  to  mini-
e  trade  of 
~
•out of non-
the  Com-
European 
Policy.  It 
I 
f 
I 
s 
osedirnprovernentsto 
) for 1975. 
as  latest trade statistics. On the  ba~i~ of 
74.  preliminary estimates, the volume of 
1.1X  trade covered should rise from [I  Jl40 
million  in  1974  to  t: 1.196 million  1n 
red  1975. 
(c)  Textiles 
fed  The  Commission  i~  a\\aiting  the 
·the  outcome of the bilateral negotiations 
fgs  under  the  Multi-fibn:~  Agreement. 
1ity  which  have  not  yet  been  completed 
I of  before  pre~ent1ng  ih  proposal<>  for 
~Ia- the GSP in  the  textile~  ~ector to the 
!the  Council. In  I 'J74, the volume of trade 
!ion 
A World Aid Fund 
The Commission  has  proposed  a  exporting  manufactured  goods;  for: 
world fund of $3,000 million to aid  instance, South Korea, Taiwan and 
the developing countries in the world  Singapore.  The  third  category;  in-
most  affected  by  the  dramatic  in- eluding countries in SE Asia (India, 
creases in world prices. The proposal  Pakistan,  Bangladesh,  Sri  Lanka), 
will be discussed at a special meeting  Central America, the Caribbean and 
of the United Nations on April 10.  some  African  countries  (the  Sahel 
Rising commodity prices have had  area, Senegal,  Kenya,· Burundi) will 
a  severe  effect  on  the  developing  be  the  most  affected.  OECD  has 
countries. The increased price of oil  estimated the additional burden for 
since  1972  will  cause  an  added  these  countries  at  about  SJ,OOO 
import  expenditure  for  all  the  mitlion. 
developing  countries  of  the  order  These  countries  are  in  a  very 
of  $10,000  million  and  this  is  serious  situation  because  they  can 
unfortunately  far  from  being  an  count on no return of capital from 
isolated  case.  In  1974  expenditure  the oil exporting countries and they 
by  these  countries  on  wheat  and  cannot expect to raise loans on the 
fertiliser  is  expected  to  increase  by  capital market. They are also likely 
about  $3·3  thousand  million  and  to suffer from any import restrictions 
$2,000  million  respectively.  To  this  imposed  by  the industrialised 
must be added the increases in export  countries.  Furthermore any  restric-
prices by the industrialised countries  tions they impose themselves on oil 
( 19  per cent  by  OECD countries in  and  fertiliser  imports  will  have  g 
1973).  serious  effects  on  the  agricultural  § 
The  price  rises  for  these  three  situation in these countries, possibly  E 
commodities alone ($15,000 million)  leading to famine.  E 
represent  30  per  cent  of  the  total  In the  light  of this  situation  the  8 
value  of the exports  of developing  Commission  has  proposed  to  the  ~ 
countries.  Council that the Community should  ~ 
The  Third  World  is  affected  in  appeal to all rich countries to join it  2 
three  different  ways.  Firstly,  there  in  an  exceptional  aid  effort.  The  ~ 
is  a  relatively  favoured  group  of  Commission suggests a world fund of  E 
countries  (e.g.  Nigeria)  who  can  approximately  S3,000  million  to  ,g 
compensate by increasing their own  distribute to  the  most  affected  "c::: 
export  prices.  A  second  group can  countries.  The  Community  would  t 
soften  the  shock  by  loans  or  by  provide  about  $500  million  of this  -6 
using  their  own  exchange  reserves.  amount, in addition to the develop- 2 
Included in this category are countries  ment aid which it must maintain.  ~ 
~------------------------------------------------------~ ~ 
covered  by  the GSP will  amount to 
about  l2o0 million 
(d)  Jute and Coir Products 
The  preferential  margin  will  be 
rai~ed from 40".,  in  1974  to 60"., in 
197 5,  as  provided  for  m  the  agree-
menb  with  India  and  Bangladesh. 
The que!->tion  of continued duty-free 
entry  for  imrorts  1nto  the  United 
K1ngdom and Denmark will  need to 
be considered. 
The  improvements  of  the  Com-
munity\  ~cheme  for  1975  will 
increase  the  practical  value  of  the 
generall',ed  preferences  to  the  de-
veloping  countries:  but  ib  purpose 
cannot  be  fully  realised  without  a 
better  understanding and  utilisation 
of the  generalised  preferences  both 
by  the  beneficiary countries, and  by 
those  concerned  within  the  Com-
munity. For this purpose: 
[J a  ~ystem for  gathering  statistical 
mformation on the utilisation of the 
scheme\\ ill  ~hortly become effective: 
~-~~  the creatilm of a  separate agency 
for  documentation.  research  and 
adv1ce  on the generalised  preference 
scheme should be studied; 
D  a  programme  of seminars  and 
other  information  activities  for  the 
assistance  of  the  beneficiary 
countries will  be actively pursued by 
the Commission. 
Administration 
The  other  main  section  of  the 
Commission's  proposals · concerns 
the  way  the  Community's  GSP  is 
administered,  and  which  ha~  often 
given  rise to criticism. The principal 
improvements are the following: 
D The number of sensitive products 
whose  import  into  Member  States 
under the scheme is  subject to quota 
will  be reduced from 51  in  1974 to 7 
in  1975.  (There were 60 in  1973.) 
D  A  Community reserve will  be in-
troduced  into the remaining quotas, 
as agreed in  principle by the Council 
in  December 1973. 
D The cut-off point which limits the 
exports  of  individual  beneficiaries 
under the  scheme,  will  be  raised  to 
so~-:; of the import ceiling for 43  of 
the 44 products transferred from the 
sensitive  to  the  semi-sensitive  cate-
gory. 
D The cut-off point for the 44 pro-
ducts  which  will  now  cease  to  be 
subject to tariff quotas will, however, 
be  reduced  to  15 ~~  in  the  case  of 
certain beneficiary countries in order 
to ensure a more equitable sharing of 
benefits. This rule is subject to certain 
safeguards,  in  particular  the  pro-
vision  that  no  beneficiary  country 
should  suffer  any  reduction  in  the 
benefits already acquired. 
D  On  rules of origin, the  Commis-
sion  proposes  that,  in  view  of the 
progress of a  number of developing 
countries  towards  regional  integra-
tion  (for  example,  the  Central 
American  Common  Market,  the 
Andean  Pact,  the  Association  of 
South East Asian Nations), a cumu-
lative system of rules of origin of the 
EFT  A  type  be  introduced  for  their 
exports to the Community under the 
scheme. European Studies, 20, 1974 
The Common Agricultural Policy II 
Michael Berendt 
The  events of the last four years have left the  common agricultural policy much 
changed.  Its old principles of  free competition between farmers in  all Member States 
have  been  hampered by the problems of monetary instability.  Since  the  world grain 
surplus turned to shortage, its role of  protecting the farmer has extended to the protection 
of the  consumer.  It has  become  more  responsive  to  public  opinion  in  the  enlarged 
Community,  but it has failed to  solve  the acute problems of those farmers hit by the 
rapidly changing economics o.f  food production following the increase in commodity and 
energy prices. 
The policy is changing still. Britain's renegotiation demands are on the table,  with 
particular emphasis on changing the beef  regime and introducing greater flexibility into 
the system. Germany is uneasy about the open-endedfinancial commitment of  paying for 
the policy and has persuaded the  Council of Ministers that a  'stock-taking' should be 
carried out before the end of  February 1975. 
A protectionist system 
Several aspects of the common agricultural policy 
were distasteful to Britain in the late 1960s.  Britain's 
adoption  of  the  policy  seemed  a  necessary  but 
unpleasant quid pro quo for the political and economic 
advantages of  membership. To British eyes it seemed a 
policy tailor-made for high-cost farmers, damaging to 
world trade and disdainful of the consumers' needs. 
It maintained prices well above world levels, yet was 
expensive for taxpayers too because of the high cost 
of keeping a  floor  in the market when  world prices 
were low. It  also militated against the low-cost agricul-
tural producers of the Commonwealth, such as  New 
Zealand,  Australia and the  Caribbean countries,  by 
excluding their relatively cheap supplies. 
Since  1970  these  arguments  have  been  turned on 
their head.  The policy still insulates the Community 
market  from  trends  on  world  markets,  but  now  it 
protects consumers against high world prices instead of 
protecting farmers against low  prices. The productive 
capacity of  West European agriculture, operating with 
relatively  stable  weather  conditions  and  a  highly 
controlled market are positive benefits in a world of 
grain shortage. The extent of the change is indicated 
by the Labour Government's attitude. While pressing 
the need to renegotiate Britain's terms  of entry,  the 
Foreign  Secretary  has  several  times  emphasised  the 
importance  of the  common  agricultural  policy  for 
assuring  stable  supplies  of foodstuffs  at reasonable 
prices.  (See  insert  Common  Agricultural  Policy  -
'Eurofood in a hungry world'.) 
The 1960s  were  characterised by heavy wheat and 
maize  surpluses  throughout  the  world,  as  the 
Americans,  Australians,  Canadians  and  Europeans 
subsidised their exports in order to dispose of surplus 
output.  For a  Britain purchasing its food  on world 
markets, it was a good time. Those surpluses have now 
disappeared.  There  is  serious  famine,  especially  in 
North Africa and the Indian sub-Continent; fertiliser 
production  and  irrigation  are  hit  by  the  rise  in  oil 
prices,  jeopardising agricultural  development  in  the 
Third World; harvests have been mediocre in both the 
United States and Canada. The world price of wheat, 
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less than £25  a ton up to 1970,  is  now £100 a ton or 
more and the United States,  which  has traditionally 
met the world's grain needs,  has been obliged to put 
curbs on its exports. 
The capacity of the EEC for producing food takes 
on a real importance in these circumstances.  Taking 
all  grains  together,  the  Nine can  produce about 90 
per cent of their needs at home, although 40 per cent 
of the maize and most of the special hard wheats used 
for pasta and for British steam-baked bread have to 
be  imported from  America.  Grain is  the  basic  raw 
material of most food production, not only for bread 
and beer,  but for pork and bacon, poultry and eggs 
and, to a lesser extent, beef and milk. A policy which 
stabilises  grain  prices  is  thereby  achieving  a 
fundamental aim of agricultural policy. 
It is  the protectionist mechanisms of the common 
agricultural  policy  which  allows  the  Community  to 
insulate itself from trends on world markets. Interven-
tion,  under  which  commodities  can  be  offered  to 
official agencies which are obliged to buy at a guaran-
teed  price,  thereby  putting  a  floor  in  the  market, 
works well with grains and may  be introduced  on a 
world  scale.  Wheat,  barley and maize can be  stored 
indefinitely  without dropping in value.  They  can be 
moved  relatively  easily  and  used  in  many  different 
ways.  Thanks  to  the  intervention  system,  the  EEC 
started the 1974/5 cereal year with eight million tons 
of wheat in store, bringing the price of wheat in the 
Community well below the price prevailing on world 
markets. In order to prevent producers or traders from 
exploiting high world market prices, the levy system is 
reversed, with levies imposed on exports of grain and 
grain products.  This keeps  down the domestic price 
and allows  controlled  exports  such  as  the  proposed 
one  million  tons  of wheat  for  India which  will  be 
provided on special terms. 
However,  although  the mechanisms  of the common 
agricultural policy work well on storable products like 
cereals and sugar, where intervention buying effectively 
levels out the peaks and troughs of price and supply, the 
same cannot be said for livestock products, where there 
have been increasing problems. The consumer influence 
In the summer of 1973,200,000 tons of butter which 
had been  bought by  official  intervention agencies  in 
the  Nine  were  exported  to  the  Soviet  Union  at a 
knock-down  price,  mainly  because  this  was  the 
cheapest way of disposing of the butter. The response 
of public  opinion  was  intensely  hostile,  not just in 
Britain, but in  other member countries of the Com-
munity too.  This was  symptomatic of an increasing 
public awareness, a consumer voice in the development 
of  the common agricultural policy which had not been 
much evident before the enlargement of  the EEC. This 
consumer interest,  which  expressed  such hostility to 
the butter sale, has had considerable influence in the 
development of the common policy. It has led to the 
introduction of two types  of butter subsidy,  one for 
consumers  in  general  and  one  for  those  on  social 
security benefits. It  has been instrumental in producing 
a fundamental reshaping of the beef policy, as well as 
the  introduction  of a  Community  beef subsidy  for 
old-age pensioners. When the basic regulations setting 
out the  market system  for  various  commodities  are 
changed,  the  consumer  interest  is  spelled  out as  it 
never was before enlargement. 
Consumer organisations are now brought into the 
policy-making process together with the farming and 
business  pressure  groups.  This  increasing  public 
awareness,  expressed particularly but not exclusively 
by the  British  government,  is  forcing  the system  of 
market  support  to  be  changed,  as  far  as  animal 
products are concerned. It is an important element in 
the current beef crisis. 
The crisis in beef production 
The tidal wave of price change which has engulfed 
the  world  since  1972  has  had  particularly  serious 
consequences  for  beef  producers,  who  found 
themselves through the summer and autumn of 1974 
receiving market prices of  £12 a live cwt. in Britain and 
Ireland  compared  with  £22  only  a  year  previously. 
Their  plight  was  the  result  of  a  conjunction  of 
circumstances which the common agricultural policy 
was ill-equipped to tackle. 
Governments and international organisations were 
unanimous only  two years  ago in suggesting almost 
limitless possibilities for beef expansion. As standards 
of living rose throughout the world, and especially in 
Europe, so beef consumption rose faster than produc-
tion.  With  the  Continental market in mind,  British 
and Irish producers invested heavily in beef. They kept 
more cattle for breeding, borrowed heavily to build up 
their investment, and anticipated a high level  of beef 
prices. 
In the spring of 1973, the Conservative Government 
abandoned  the  British  guarantee  arrangements  on 
beef, since the buying-in system had been strengthened 
to put a bottom in the market: if  prices dropped to the 
official support levels, farmers would be entitled to sell 
to  the  intervention  agencies  and be  guaranteed  the 
intervention price.  The British Government believed 
that  this  EEC  policy  should  give  beef  producers 
security enough. 
When the Labour Government took office in March 
1974,  it  found  the  intervention  system  politically 
unacceptable.  Taking beef off the market, freezing it 
and then exporting it could be justified neither within 
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the  Labour Party nor to  public opinion in  general. 
The government pressed successfully for the suspension 
of intervention in Britain, leaving beef producers with 
neither the old form of support nor the new. The early 
optimism of British and Irish farmers bore fruit in the 
summer  of 1974.  It proved misplaced.  The costs  of 
their feeding stuffs had increased, interest rates were 
at record levels  and - perhaps worst of all - the oil 
crisis had severely cut the spending money available to 
consumers.  People  were  no  longer  buying  as  much 
beef, yet some 30 per cent more was coming on to the 
market.  Support  buying  was  operated  by  the  Irish 
government,  but the weakness  of the British market 
made the system totally ineffective. It  worked better on 
the Continent, but even there the authorities were short 
of storage space and market prices fell far below the 
intended floor price. 
Throughout 1974 the British government was press-
ing  for  changes  in  the  Community's  beef support 
system,  advocating  the  introduction  of  deficiency 
payments in place of intervention.  In the summer a 
beef slaughter premium scheme was introduced as an 
alternative to intervention - at least a  half-way  step 
towards  deficiency  payments,  but  even  that  was 
powerless to ward off the beef crisis of the autumn, 
which was in turn exacerbated by shortage of winter 
feed. The slaughter premium scheme involved a direct 
payment  on  each  beef  animal  going  through  the 
slaughterhouse,  raising  the  farmer's  return  without 
pushing up the price of meat. 
Although it did not solve the problems, the Com-
munity's introduction of  such a scheme was significant. 
It was a recognition that a system of direct payments 
not affecting the market price could play a useful role 
in  the  market organisation  for  a  livestock  product, 
making  intervention  less  important  and  allowing 
greater play to the pressures of supply and demand. 
Development  of the  common  agricultural  policy  will 
almost certainly follow this new path.l 
Towards deficiency payments? 
Deficiency payments are often seen as the answer to 
all the problems facing the common agricultural policy, 
but this ignores the fact that, as applied in Britain, they 
were  designed  for  an  agricultural  industry  which 
could  not  meet  all  domestic  needs.  Deficiency 
payments  cover  the  difference  between  the  average 
market price and a guaranteed price. In Britain market 
prices could be sustained by applying quotas or levies 
on imports, thereby limiting the financial liability of 
the guarantees. For products where the Community is 
in substantial deficit, as with olive oil and the durum 
wheat (which is used for making pasta), a system akin 
to deficiency payments is used, but for other products 
where  self-sufficiency  is  already  achieved  (including 
beef during  1974),  there  would  be  no  limit  on the 
Community's  financial  liability  under  a  guarantee 
system.  M.  Lardinois,  Commission  member 
responsible  for  agriculture,  has  estimated  that  the 
cost of a guarantee system  would be at least double 
that of the existing EEC arrangements. 
A  further  problem  of  deficiency  payments  is 
administration.  The  British  farming  population  is 
small and well-informed, while government extension 
I  Under interim arrangements agreed in November 1974,  Britain did actually 
introduce a deficiency payment scheme with Community blessing, coupled with 
limited intervention buying to put a ftoor in the market. services  are  highly  trained.  The  administrative 
problems facing countries like France and Italy would 
be formidable, since the farming population is so much 
larger and the  government services  less  involved  in 
such policy  administration.  Direct payments  on the 
product are likely to become a more common element 
in  EEC  agricultural  policy.  The  measures  already 
adopted  by  the  Council  of Ministers  for  providing 
special aid to farmers in regions with low incomes and 
a  declining population will  provide direct aid in the 
form of payments per head of cattle and sheep on a 
similar basis to British hill farm subsidies.  This hill 
farming measure recognises that special regions have 
special problems - a recognition which was difficult to 
find  in the  early  days  of the  common  agricultural 
policy. 
An  additional  measure  much  discussed  in  the 
context of high Community prices is  the direct social 
subsidy, designed to raise the farmer's personal income 
to a certain level while allowing guaranteed prices to 
fall. In a limited sense this has already been introduced 
for older farmers who wish to quit farming. They now 
qualify for a pension plus an acreage bonus for giving 
up most of their farm for the enlargement of another. 
On a  larger scale,  however,  direct income  subsidies 
are never likely to be acceptable. They are intensely 
disliked  by  the  farming  population,  and  are  both 
difficult and expensive to implement, although there is 
nothing to stop member governments applying them if 
they wish. 
A common policy 
An early aim of  the common agricultural policy was 
to strengthen the ties  between member countries by 
linking their economies more closely.  To the extent 
that trade in agricultural products between  Member 
States has increased enormously over the last 10 years 
it has  been  effective,  but monetary difficulties  have 
presented many problems.  Instead of representing a 
single market for agricultural goods, the Nine comprise 
five separate markets, each protected from the others. 
This has become necessary  or desirable for member 
countries for complex monetary reasons. To take one 
example:  when the £ floats  down in value it would 
normally make the British farmer more competitive in 
the markets  of other EEC member countries,  while 
correspondingly raising the cost of imported food to 
British  consumers.  When  a  country  like  Germany 
revalues its currency, it has the opposite effect. 
In  order  to  protect consumers and farmers from 
this  sudden  change,  border  taxes  are  imposed  on 
agricultural  products  flowing  from  one  member 
country to another (so-called monetary compensatory 
amounts). In countries with strong currency it is  the 
farmers who are defended, whereas consumers benefit 
in countries with weak currencies. A British producer 
selling to Germany would  have to pay a  substantial 
levy to nullify any advantage given him by the devalued 
£.  His  German  counterpart  receives  an  equivalent 
subsidy  to  allow  him  to compete  as  before  in  the 
British  market.  To  importers  and  exporters,  such 
complication is  a  nightmare.  But trade continues to 
flow,  while different- rather than common -levels of 
price prevail in different member countries. 
The other aspect of the 'common' policy which has 
been put under pressure is  that relating to national 
aids.  Community rules  are strict.  Only national aids 
which  do  not distort competition by  giving  farmers in 
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one  country  an advantage  over  those  in  another  are 
acceptable.  France,  once  the  staunchest defender of 
Community discipline,  breached  these  rules  in July. 
The  government  introduced  special  payments  to 
French cattle and pig producers to help them weather 
the problems of low prices and high costs. France did 
not  consult  the  Commission  or  the  Council  of 
Ministers  about these  measures and as a  result the 
Commission decided to challenge French action at the 
European Court of Justice. 
There is a further logic in the restrictions on national 
aid. Help may be given to a particular farming sector 
by  a  member  government,  leading  to  increased 
production  which  may in turn cost money  for  the 
EEC Farm Fund, so all member countries have to pay 
for  the  consequences  of  one  country's  unilateral 
action.  Any  concessions  to  Britain's  renegotiation 
request for the right to take limited unilateral action 
for a limited period in particular areas will therefore 
have to take into account these financial  considera-
tions. It  was on this basis that the German Government 
delayed agreement on agricultural prices in September 
1974,  demanding  a  Council  declaration  against 
unilateral national aids. 
Agricultural policy and general 
policy 
Because  agricultural  policy  has  developed  much 
more quickly and much further than other Community 
policies,  it  has  sometimes  failed  to  take  adequate 
account of other sectors. The ministers meeting in the 
Council  have  tended  to  take  decisions  which  have 
important implications for development policy,  over 
seas  trade or economic policy,  without taking those 
implications fully into account. 
This has not been the fault of agricultural policy as 
such, nor of  the ministers concerned, but rather of the 
Community as a whole for failing to develop a common 
position  on those  other policies.  This  is  something 
which  is  now  changing.  The  Community  of Nine 
conducts 40 per cent of world trade, giving it a heavy 
responsibility to see that its agricultural policy making 
does not damage that world trade. The Commission 
successfully resisted the imposition of a ban on beef 
imports  despite  the  deteriorating  market  situation 
during 1974 and although the ban was later imposed, 
talks  were  immediately  started  with  supplying 
countries to discuss some type of phasing agreement. 
The  financial  constraints  on  the  policy  are  also 
becoming tighter and the heads of state of Germany, 
France and Britain have  all  spoken of the  need  to 
watch more carefully the decision of their agricultural 
ministers.  In these ways,  the policy is being forced to 
become more responsive to the needs of the Community 
and is no longer as single-mindedly concerned with the 
position of the farming population as it was in the 1960s. 
While  one  cannot  anticipate  the  results  of  the 
renegotiation process,  it is  remarkable  how far  the 
conflicts of interest between nine different agricultural 
policies in the mid-1960s will  have become a largely 
common interest by the mid-'70s. 
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DORDOGNE 
The farmers' unhappy lot 
THEY LIKE a  good joke irl  the 
Dordogne and right now,  m  spite 
of their anger, the farmers there 
have  got  one  that  is  cheermg 
them  aU  up  no  end.  The  joke 
revolves around M.  Yves  <.iucna, 
the  Gaullist  politician  who  was 
Transport  Minister  until  earlier 
this  summer  when  M.  Giscard 
d'Estaing's  presidenl!al  victory 
shuffled  him  out of  the  Govern-
ment. M.  Gucna is  also Mayor of 
Pt'ngcux,  the  regional  seat  of 
the deeply rural Pcrigold area in 
South West France. 
Driving  to  an  urgent  mPeting 
recently, the ex-Minister had the 
misfortune to  run foul  of a  con-
tingent  of  militant  farmers  on 
their way  into town  to  take part 
in  a  20,000-strong  demonstration 
in support of their " fair deal for 
agnculture "  campaign. 
Punctured 
H1s  tyrcs  were  slashed  and, 
immobiliscd,  M.  Guena  had  no 
ch01cc  but  to  take  part  in  an 
hour-long,  heated  debate  on  the 
farm  crisis.  What  makes  every-
one  in  the  Dordogne  regiOn 
laugh so  much is the simple, per· 
haps  rather  laboured,  pun  that 
Gucna  was  "dc~onlle,"  a  term 
, meaning punctured which is  also 
slang  for  taking  someone  down 
a  peg. 
The  laughter  ut  M.  Gucna's 
quite  unsought  humiliation  is 
probably  in  direct  proportion to 
the  farmers'  resentment  aguinst 
the  French authorities who  they 
blame for their current unhappy 
circumstances.  For  in  the  quiet, 
hilly"  Dordog~e. as in  most othPr 
agricultural areas in  France, the 
farmers'  lot  has  become  a  very 
unhappy  one. 
The  " paysans "  reckon  that, 
overall,  their  standard  of living 
has  dropped  a  shattering 20  per 
BY  GILES  MERRITT  IN  PARIS 
cent. this year because of falling  the  Dordogne  is  M.  Georges  Government has indicated that it 
prices  for  their  produce  and  Trijoulet,  the  chairman  of  the  intends  introducmg  general 
rapid  inflation  in  the  cost  of  region's  influential  Chambre  reforms  that  would  make  credit 
the  materials  they  must  buy  to  d'Agriculture. whose  presence at  easier for farmers. 
run  their farms.  the  Guena tyre-slashing  incident  But  the reform which  farmers 
The unrest that has broken out  has not gone unremarked. Mayor  throughout  France  want  most 
in  sporadic  acts  of  violence  of  the  tiny  village  of  Allemans  urgently  of all  1s  the  immediate 
during  this  year  has  in  high  and  a  smallholder  himself,  raising  of  produce  prices  and 
summer  begun  to  reach  crisis  M.  Trijoulet  is  the~  fervent  their  peggmg  to  the  official  cost 
proportions.  The  technique  of  advocate of  a  major  reappraisal  of  living  mdex.  The  Govern-
blocking  main  roads  busy  with  by  the  Government  of  the  ment,  of  course,  is  caught 
tounst traffic  has  brought  home  farmers'  situation-he  claims  squarely  between  these  demands 
to  the  French  the  depth  of  the  that  under  the  present  system  and the conflicting  wi~hes of the 
farmers'  feeling  far  more  than  they are discriminated against in  EEC  Commission,  which  has 
previous  demonstrations,  even  a  way  that  no  other  occupati\ln  already  instituted  proceedings 
when  they  resulted  m  tragic  or  social  class  is.  against  France  in  the  European 
injuries  to  passers-by.  There  Court. 
has  also  been  an  element  of  W  d F•  The  emergency  aid  funds 
comedy and rural farce  in  many  00  IreS  amounting  to  Frs.600m.  that the 
of  the  protests;  the  spectacle  of  .  .  French  Government  voted  last 
cows  carrying  Placards  along  President  Giscard  d'~staing month  to  cushion  the  effects  of 
crowded  holiday  beaches,  for  ~grees.  ,  H~  recently  said  that  price  falls  on  farmers  here,  £:! 
imtance.  farmers  mcomes  should  be  principally those engaged in beef  -~ 
But in  the Dordogne there are  comparable ,,W1th  those  of  other and  pork  production,  are  con·  :l 
fears that an increasing number  occupatwns.  .  The  problem,  sidered  by  the  EEC  to  threaten  ·E 
~!u~~~~~l  kq~a:~~:~s  b~~~e~a~~i~~ ~~;'e~:~~;i~~s ~~th 1~~~ke:pe;r}~!~  l?:m~~:e~gr~~~lt~:~/l~~li~~-the  ~ 
costs-fertilisers  have  risen  The  yeoman  farmer  traditiOn  .., 
almost  50  per  cent.  this  year,  that  has  helped  British  agricul- . The  farmers,  though,  con- .o 
while  jute  and  sisal  increases  ture  to  become  remarkably  pro·  sld·er  that  thes,e  controversial  ~ 
have  tripled  the  cost  of  binder  gressive  when  compared  to  that subsidies.  are  not  enough  and  ~ 
twine-and earnings likely to be  of  France,  does  not  exist.  In  back  thell'  case  up  by  pomtmg  o0 
uown  15  per  cent.  this  year  most areas smallholctings are the  out  that  this  year  French  ~ 
bel·ause  of  weak  market  prices,  rule,  largely  as  a  result  of  the  agricultural  produchon  will 
farming seems to have become a  Code Napoleon, which for over a  have  dropped  Frs.10,000m.  from  ~ 
profitless  occupation  century  called  for  property  to  1973  levels-as  much  as  the  E 
In  the  last  20  y~ars  French  be  divide,d  equally  between  a  country's  total  farm  produce  h 
farmers  have  !.'One  out  of  dead  mans  children.  Poor  edu·  export surplus last year.  -
business at thP rate of one every  ~ation  and  a  l~ck  of  regional  The  pro:blem  appears  as  ·~ 
10  minutes.  The  proportion  of·  evelopment  un_til  recently  have  intractable  in  France as  it is  m  § 
the  population  on  the  land  has  made .  rural  hfe  t~e  slowest  other  EEC  member  countries.  E:! 
dwindled  from  29  per  cent.  to  changmg  element  m  modern  And  the  situation  is  made  no  ~ 
13 per cent.  ln really poor areas  F~ance. ~n thP Dordogne farmers'  easier  by  the  fact  that  farmers  111 
of  Frunce,  such  as  the  moun- Wives.  st1ll  _oft~n cook  over  wo~d in,  say,  the  Dordogne  find  the  ..t: 
tainous  Savoie,  farming  family  fires Ill th\1r k1tchens and lf the~r intricacies  of  Brussels  negotia- h 
incomes  a·,era.~:e  only  F'rs.7.900  !ootwear  IS  no  longer  clogs  lt  lion  and  CAP  wrangling  as  E 
a  year. French farmers calculate  Is  . the  Twentieth  Cent_ury  perplexing as anyone else.  Asked  ,g 
Ew.t  60 per rent. of their number  eqUivalent-straw  filled  wellmg- how he believes the French Gov-
earn  considerably  less  than  the  ton boots.  ernment  should  reconcile  the  'g 
s~.~uc.  the  legal  minimum  wage  M. Trijoulet and his supporters  clash  in  interests  of  its  own  ~ 
of  £1.100  a  year.  ln  the  are pressing for the Dordogne to  farmers  and  of  its  European  't1 
Dordogne  the  percentage  is  put  be  declared  a  "Rural  Renova- partners,  M.  Trijoulet  replied  e 
at  about  70  per  cent.  tion Zone," as a first step towards  flatly:  "I don't know.  That's up  ~ 
One  of  the  chief  militants  in  modernisation,  and  already  the  to  them."  ~ 
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•  1n  hungry world  Eurofood  a 
ROBERT STEPHENS, our Diplomatic 
Correspondent, says  membership of the EEC 
may  have  cut the cost of our food. 
The recent in· 
crease in world  food  prices, 
especially  for  cereals.  has 
been almost as striking as for 
oil. Some experts believe this 
is a  temporary phenomenon 
and that prices will go down 
again  as  supply  increases. 
Others argue that what we are 
seeing is a  structural change 
in the  world  economy  com-
parable  with  the  increasing 
scarcity  value  of  oiL  For 
there is constant pressure on 
food supplies from expanding 
world  population  and  from 
the  change  in  eating  habits 
of  richer  countries.  And 
countries which  were  form· 
erly big food exporters, such 
as  the  Latin  Americans.  are 
eatinf:~ more of their prorluce 
themselves instead of selling 
it abroad. 
A switch to eating meat in-
stead  of  cereals  means  in 
effect a  greater consumption 
of  cereals.  because the  live-
stock  or poultry  have  to  be 
fed.  It is  Russia's  commit-
ment to a richer diet. as much 
as  poor home  harvests. that 
has in  recent years sent ht>r 
into  the worlu  markets  as a 
hea·. y  buyer of grain. 
There  is  strong  evidence 
tlldt the old picture of Britain 
being  forced  to  choose  be-
tween  free  access  to  cheap 
world  food  and  the  high 
prices of the protected Com-
mon  Market  is  no  longer 
\ :thd.  The era of cheap food, 
L  :~--·  cheap  oil,  mav  now  be 
m:er. 
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By  Reginald  Dale,  Common 
Market  Correspondent 
BRUSSELS, August 5. 
BRITAIN  IS  to  rPcPivp  a 
furtlwr  series  of  grants,  total-
ling £3.:~m  .. , from tlw EEC farm 
fund  towards  mod<·rnising 
agricultun•  and  the  food  and 
fishing  industries,  1  he  Brussels 
Commission  announct>d  to-day. 
Coming  on  top  of  a  first 
hat('h of grants, worth just ovt>r 
t5m..  announ<·t•d  last  month, 
the  lalc•st  paynwnts nwan  that 
tlw  U.K.  will  hav<'  rt'<'eiHd  a 
total  of  ju-;t  onr  £R.:~m.  from 
the " guidaiH'<' "  sect ion  of  tlu• 
fund  for Hl7:t 
With  tlw  allo<·ation  of  last 
yt•ar's  funds  now  complel<•,  ~ 
to-day's  figures  show  that  .9 
Brilain  r<'<'<•ind  just  undt·r  12  -~ 
J><'r  l'l'lll.  of the 170m. l 1nit-;  of  E 
Aceount  (t70m.)  for struetural  ~ 
impt·on·nwnts  in  th<•  first  y<•ar  Q, 
of  U.K  Common  l\larket  .., 
memlwrship.  ..o 
Tlw  largest  amount,  47nt.  ~ 
Units, or almost 2K  !H'r  C<'lll.  of  oc) 
tlw  total,  wt·nt  to  Italy,  fol- ~ 
lowed  by  (;('rmany  with  just  ~ 
und<•r  40m.  Units, and  Franc<•,  E 
with  just  ow•r  :wm.  Belgium  h 
and  the  Netherlands  both 
rt'('eived  around  10m.,  In•land  ·~ 
6.9m.  and  Denmark  4.7m.  ~ 
British  projl•cts  (Jualifying  g 
for  help  undt•t·  the  decisions  ~ 
announeed to·dav include road- 111 
building,  drainage  and  flood  ~ 
control  in  rural  areas.  OthPr  E 
grants  will  go  to  the  meat,  p 
dairy  and  \'<'gt>tables  srctors.  ot. 
Funds will  also br madt>  avail- ~ 
ablr to help a  number of other  ~ 
projrrts,  includin,g  tht>  con·  ~ 
struction of three  fishin~ boats  l: 
and a  nrw  potato  chip fa<·tory  ~ 
in W<'st  Lothian.  ~ 
EEC AGRICULTURE 
Militant farmers 
march again 
BY  JOHN  CHERRINGTON,  AGRICULTURE  CORRESPONDENT  IN  BRUSSELS 
l''RENCH  AND  BELGIAN  made  other  improvements  artd  Then'  had  been  hopes  durmg 
farmers  have  been  demonstrat- mcreased the stockmg rate.  She  the  period  that  ~i  Chirac  thc 
ing  their  discontent  dunng  the  had·  quite  a  good  car,  two  tr:~c- Prime l\1imster was  in  charge of 
lasi few  days  by  blocking  roads  tors,  a  baler,  combine  harvester a;ncnltute.  Ht>  had  defendE'd 
with  tractors,  spreading  slurry  and all the usual  machmery.  them  well  1n  Brus~els.  Of  the 
m  the  streets  of  Le  Mans  in  She did not feel  she was  lucl<y  present  MimstPr,  M.  Chnst!im 
Normandy,  letting  pigs  loose  m  to  be  borrowing  at  such  a  low  Bonnet.  she  used  a  phrase  bP&t 
traffic  m  Brittany. and yesterday  ra.te  of  interest It was  only  pro- tramlated  as  .a  man  who  would 
they blocked  the motorway from  vided  because,  she  said.  the  he  unablf>  to fighi his way out of 
~a~~;r~~s ~~~s;~~li~o~ifh  ~~!~~ authorities  knew  the  farmers  a  papN bag. 
problems.  could  not  pay  more.  The  milk  ShP  had  not  yet  demonstrated, 
The  reactiOns  of  the  French  price was  poor in  her region  (it  hut  would  he  happy  to  send  a 
Press  have  been  cool,  but these  vanes  considerably  over  the  tractor  if  askl'd  Her  hopes  of 
happenings  have  been  widely  country)  and  prices  for  calves  tb<'  future clepPnf!f'd  either on  11 
reported  and  are  likely  to  con  and  cull  cows  were  now  at  "grP' n  franc."  ~me<'  denied  by 
tinue  if the  Agricultural  Minis·  :·disaster"  levels.  She  had  no  thn  GovPrnPwnt,  and  a  realisa· 
ters who have been meetmg here  wtentwn of gtvmg up_  before her  tion hy cons\Pne:s that they must 
for  the  past  two  days  fail  to  son  came  home  but  mtended  to  pa" more 
come  up  with  some  "miracle ..  increase  the cows  to  40  when  he  · 
~~~~ti1~rofb~~~i~r~~b~:em~t~~~~  di~;rain prices were good  hut. or  Feed costs 
on  wluch  Bntish  attention  IS  course,  her  farm  was  not  big  Lookcn  ~~  obJH'(JYeh·  the 
focused.  enough  for  cereal  productiOn  st~ndord> of  J;vm~ of  h~r 'sort of  ~ 
In  spite  of  diligent  research  alone.  She  was  on  the  look-out  meUium  f<JrnH'r  d,d  net seem  to  .9 
the  only  actual  demonstrations  for  more land, as qmte a bll  \<>•as  he  tno  b<Jd.  Tht'Y  had  to  work  .~ 
l  havl'  encountP-red  was  outside  commg up  to  rent as  very small  hard.  m  scm<'  c:,<e~  very  hard,  E 
the  Charlemange  building  here  ~armers were forced out of faun·  hut  t!w!l·  cars.  maehtnPry  and  "-
to-day  where  the  Agricultural  mg_.  But  although  rents  were  househ(\ld e<Juipment  were good.  ~ 
Ministers  are  meeting-and  the  stnctly_  controlll'd,  someho:OV  or lt  is  significant  that  the  com·  ""' 
police  seemed  to  be  in  about  other  It  was  al~ays  the  larger  plaints  are  for  the  most  part  n 
equal  numbers  to  the  farmers.  far~ers who mana_ged to get hold  centred  on  the  medium-sized  ..o 
So  I  will  crystallise the farmers'  of  It,  and  once  m~talled  th~re enterprise such as  she had.  Th~t  ":!' 
case  m  the words  of  one  lady  I  ~~sm no  chance  of  dislodgmg  very  small  peasant  holdin:;,•  ::: 
~~~~g  d~~~n~o::r  b~t~~e;f  R~?:::  Like  liiOSt  farmers  I  met  she  ~~l~e~r~ffd~vb~~~hi~~~e  G~v!~~~  t-.: 
and  Verdun  in  North-East  had  been  well  briefed  in  such  ment  with  spf>cial  subsidies  for  -. 
France  a  plPasant area reminis·  things as the comparison bo:>tween  retirement  and  bv  their  fellow  "" 
CPnt  of  Hampshire,  devoted  ~armers'  incomes  wit~  those  in  farmers worlnng on rather larger  E 
mainly to mixed farming in quite  mdustry.  The  intQUlttes  of  the  units.  g.:: 
big units.  ~~::;;~e~~  ~~a~~~~sa~~ 
0 1~:o~nete~·:  Any farmers growmg grain on 
Interest rates 
rmse  are  a  common  talkin..,  the he~tE'r lands. and on  econon~IC·  ] 
point.  The  Italian  market  fo~ ally  stz~d  holdmgs  ar<>  keepmg  ~ 
beef had been destroyed, but the  a  pretty  low  profile.  The  high  § 
She was,  she told me,  farmmg  Italians  were  taking  beef  still  gram  prtcE's  over  the  past  few  .5 
150  acres  of  moderate  land  not  from  Eastern  Europe.  The  com- years  have  made  them  v_ery  ~:~;., 
too  badly  f~:agmented  although  pensatory  amounts  payable  on  prosperous anC!  these htgh prices  111 
the  c••ws  were  bemg  dnven  a  exports  and  imports  of  farm  have  at  the  same  tune  made  ~ 
mile  to  that day's  pasture.  She  products  should  be  abolished.  things  im~ensely more  difficult  h 
had one son at home and another  The Insh should not flood Franc<J  for  the  hvesto~k  farm~rs  who  E 
m  the  army  whom  she  hoped  with  cheap  cattle  and  calves  have to feed gram to their stock. 
would  come  back  and  take  her  (this was  news to me  and a very  The demonstrations  are  aimed  ,g 
place.  She  was  getting tired  of  doubtful  claim  but  was  re- as much at national governments 
mil.king  30  cows  twice . a  ~ay peatedly  said).  They  had  been  as  at  the  Common  Market,  and  ~ 
which  she  had  been  domg  for  encouraged  to  produce  more  French farmers are setting great  ~ 
20  years.  The  farm  had  been  beef  and  rear  more  calves  two  store on  the results of their own  ::S 
ltre~~ ~~~~~~t  t:hl~~n~h~o~!m~~  ~~~~~e~l~. ~~~  c~~~oft~rfin';~\~  [it~~e~n:~~o~1e;at~i~;\o~:e~~~1  ~ 
Hbout £17.000  at 4!  per cent., she  was  nsing fast  and nothing was  some  national  r<?lief  measures  ~ 
had  renewed  the  buildings  and  done.  w11l  be  announced.  ~ 
the European price when the 
latter was higher.  Now,  in-
stead of protecting the Euro-
pean farmer against cheaper 
r.ereal  imports,  the  Com· 
munity is having to pay him 
a  subsidy, raised through an 
import levy, to sell his gram 
within  the  Common  Market 
rather than outside it at the 
world price.  In practice, as 
Mr  George  Thomson  has 
pointed out, this means that 
France  is  giving  Britain  a 
bread subsidy. 
Commonwealth  sugar  at 
prices  well  below  tnose 
obtainable in Europe or else-
where.  But  higher-priced 
markets are likely to exert a 
arowina  attraction  for  these 
producers : already New Zea· 
land is exporting a good deal 
less than her permitted quota 
of  butter  and  cheese  to 
Britain. 
effects, among them the pre-
carious storage of perishablt 
products such as butter  and 
beef brought in  by the Com-
mission  when  the  market 
price falls  below the official 
guaranteed  p r i c e.  Yet  ~ 
changes  in  the  world  food  ·~ 
situation  may  present  the  ·~ 
general  policy  of  encourag- E 
ing  European  farm  produc- ~ 
tion  in  a  new light.  In any  £ 
event, this policy should not  -.:to 
operate  in  isolation.  Food  ~ 
supply,  like  oil,  is  a  world  r...:: 
problem  that  needs  even- -. 
tually  to  be  tackled  on  a  ~ 
world  scale,  involving  both  ~ 
producers and consumers.  .o 
Britain imports just under 
a  half her wheat needs.  In 
1972  about half her  imports 
came from the United States 
and  Canada  and  a  quarter 
from  Western  Europe,  but 
British millers are now using 
twice as much European grain 
as last year.  The EEC  as a 
whole is almost self-sufficient 
in wheat 
Under the EEC agreements, 
Britain  still  has  access  for 
aome  time  to  New  Zealand 
butter  and  cheese  and  to 
In Europe itself the aize of 
the farm problem has, in any 
case,  begun  to  change,  and 
with it the political influence 
of farmers on European gov-
ernments. Over the past seven 
years  the  number of people 
engaged  in  farming  on  the 
continent has shrunk from an 
average of nearly 16 per cent 
to 11 per cent.  The European 
Commission  has  also  pro-
posed reforms that would re-
duce the costs of the CAP by 
about £500 million a year. 
The  British are not  alone 
in  criticising the cost of the 
CAP  and  its  more  absurd 
0  Meanwhile,  it  is  arguable  111 
that the British Government,  ~ 
far  from  c h o o s i n g  this  E 
moment to launch an  all-out  o 
attack  on  European  agricul·  .t. 
ture as  a  monstrous burden,  1 
should  now  be  soberly  re- ::s 
examining  it  as  a  potential e 
shield in a hungry world.  ~ 
~ European Studies, 20, 1974 
Direct Elections 
Ben  Patterson 
The 198 members of  the European Parliament, unlike those of  most other parliaments 
in  the world,  are not at present elected directly by the people they represent.  Instead, 
under  Article 138 of the  EEC Treaty,  they are  drawn from among  Members of the 
various national parliaments 'in accordance with the procedure laid down by each Member 
State'. 
It was never envisaged by the founding fathers of  the Community, however, that this 
arrangement should be permanent. Article 138(3) of  the EEC Treaty declares that the 
Parliament shall itself 'draw  up proposals for elections by direct universal suffrage in 
accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member States'. It is then up to the Council, 
'acting  unanimously',  to  recommend  appropriate  provisions  to  Member  States  Jor 
adoption in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements'. 
Why direct elections? 
There are good arguments,  both practical and  of 
principle,  for  pressing  ahead  with  the  change  to 
direct elections. To begin with, the first sentence of the 
EEC Treaty refers to 'an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe'. So far, what unity there has been 
has largely concerned administrations and politicians. 
The  exercise  of suffrage  as  a  European  civil  right 
would help give ordinary people the sense of  belonging 
to a European political whole. 
Secondly,  direct  elections  would  embody  another 
fundamental principle: the faith of the Community in 
free elections and in parliamentary democracy. This is 
all the more important in that parliamentary institu-
tions have recently been under attack both within the 
Community and in other parts of the world. 
Thirdly,  direct  elections  would  help  restore 
democratic control over those aspects of government 
which have been transferred from the competence of 
nation states to supra-national institutions. Critics of 
the Community repeatedly complain that the 'Euro-
cracy'  (both  Commission  and  Council)  is  remote, 
secretive,  and  irresponsible.  Control  by  a  directly 
elected  Parliament  would  do  much  to  put matters 
right. 
Finally,  there  is  one  severely  practical  argument. 
Nomination from national parliaments under Article 
138(1)  means  that  each  Member  of the  European 
Parliament  has  a  dual  mandate.!  As  Parliament's 
powers  increase,  so  will  the  work  load - and it is 
already estimated, for example, that a United Kingdom 
Member of the Commons would need some 450 days 
in  the  year  to  carry  out  properly  his  duties  at 
Westminister and to his constituents, and his duties at 
Strasbourg,  Luxembourg  and  Brussels.  Only  by 
directly  electing  European Parliament Members  can 
this growing problem be satisfactorily overcome. 
What has been done? 
Acting  with  immense  promptness,  the  European 
Parliament  had  by  1960  already  drawn  up  a  draft 
Convention for  the holding of direct elections.  This 
was based on the report of a working party chaired by 
Fernand Dehousse, and envisaged simply tripling the 
1  Article 138(1) states:  'The Assembly shall consist of delegates who shall be 
designated by the respective Parliaments from among their members in accordance 
with the procedure laid down by each Member State.' 
1 
size  of the Parliament (then  142  members),  the extra 
284 being directly elected. This scheme, however, has 
'lain  on  the  table',  awaiting  Council  decision,  ever 
since.  Meanwhile,  as  Fernand  Dehousse  himself 
noted  in  1969,  'not a  year  has  passed  without  its 
motions,  declarations,  symposia,  bill  proposals  and 
papers on the subject'.  Almost every  Member State 
has  at  some  stage  considered  proposals  to  elect 
directly  at least  its  own  national  delegations,  on  a 
unilateral basis. 
With the enlargement of the Community in 1973 it 
became  necessary  for  the  Parliament to  draw  up  a 
revised Convention. The Parliament's Political Affairs 
Committee  presented  revised  proposals  in  January 
1975. 
Some problems 
The  long  delay  since  the  1960  Convention  was 
drafted, however, is evidence of the difficulties which 
must be  overcome.  A  directly elected Parliament, it 
has  been  argued,  might  be  isolated  from  the  real 
centres  of power,  that is,  the national governments. 
The political make-up of the Parliament  afte~ direct 
elections might be more hostile to the Commumty than 
the present assembly.  There might be a disreputably 
low poll; or the results might reflect domestic issues 
in the Member States rather than Community matters. 
Initially,  perhaps,  some  of these  fears  might  be 
realised;  but essentially they are self-contradictory. A 
Parliament which  brought forces  of discontent into 
the  open,  for  example,  would  stimulate  interest  in 
European elections, and would focus critical attention 
on the collective performance of the national govern-
ments.  In moving to direct elections,  nevertheless,  a 
number of particular problems have to be solved. 
The chicken and the egg 
One  major reason for  the  delay  in  holding direct 
elections  has  been  the  feeling  that  these  would  be 
meaningless until the Parliament has greater powers; 
simultaneously,  it  has  been  argued  that Parliament 
cannot be  given  such  powers  until its  Members  are 
more  democratically  elected.  To  break  out  of this 
'chicken-egg'  dilemma,  a  programme  is  required  in 
which the move to direct elections and the increase in 
powers takes place in parallel. Unilateral action 
The delay  in implementing Article  138(3)2  of the 
EEC Treaty has prompted a large number of schemes 
for  directly  electing  separate  national  delegations 
while 138(1) is still in force. The chief difficulty here is 
that Members must still, formally, be 'designated by 
the  respective  (national)  parliaments  from  among 
their  members'.  This  effectively  means  that  only 
existing national MPs can be eligible to stand (as in 
the  most  recent  Belgian  proposal);  or  that,  after 
election,  European Parliamentarians  must  somehow 
be co-opted to the national parliaments (as proposed 
by  Lord  O'Hagan  in  his  recent  Bill).  The  Vedel 
Report pointed out in 1972 that such schemes would 
also  tend  to  'nationalise'  European  elections,  and 
'would  not mobilise  public  opinion  at a  European 
level'. 
What is uniform? 
National electoral systems  within the  Community 
vary  widely,  from  proportional  respresentation 
through  a  party  list  system  in  Belgium,  Italy, 
2 .Article.I38(3) states: '!he Assembly shall draw up proposals for elections by 
dtrect umversal suffrage m accordance with a  uniform procedure in all Member 
States. 
~he  ~ouncil shall, acting unanimouslY. lay down the appropriate provisions, 
wh1ch  It shall recommend to Member States for adoption in  accordance with 
their respective constitutional requirements.' 
Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands,  to  the  British 
system  of  'first  past  the  post'  in  single-member 
constituencies (see Table 1). 
How can a  system of election possibly be devised 
which will be simultaneously acceptable to the voters 
in all these countries? A great deal depends on what is 
meant  by  the  phrase  in  Article  138(3)  of the  EEC 
Treaty: 'a uniform procedure'. It is not necessarily the 
same thing as a 'uniform electoral system'. Both in the 
1960  Convention, indeed,  and in preparing the new 
Convention, the Parliament has interpreted the Article 
to mean only a 'minium of common principles', which 
each  Member State can implement in its  own  way. 
Thus,  initially  at  least,  European  Parliamentarians 
could be elected according to the systems prevailing in 
their own countries. 
Minimum common principles 
What, then, should be the scope of the regulations 
to be laid down at Community level? 
First,  there  is  the  question  of what constitutes  a 
genuine  election:  the  main  basic  principles  are  that 
elections should be free,  general, direct and secret. 
Secondly, there is admissibility of  parties. Clearly  a 
'direct election' in which all but one party was bann'ed 
would be a sham; but can it be left to Member States 
Table 1 
Systems of Election in Member States 
Country  Voting age 
Belgium  21 
Denmark  20 
France  18 
Germany  18 
Ireland  18 
Italy  21* 
Luxembourg  18 
Netherlands  18 
United Kingdom  18 
* 25 for Senate elections. 
System of voting (lower chambers) 
Votes for party lists in multi-member 
constituencies. Proportionality 
between parties assured at provincial 
level. Voting compulsory. 
Votes for party lists in multi-member 
constituencies. Proportionality 
between parties assured at national 
level. 
Single vote in single-member 
constituencies. If  no absolute 
majority, second ballot between leading 
candidates. Proportionality not 
assured. 
Each elector has two votes: one for 
candidates in single-member 
constituencies, the second for party 
lists. Proportionality between 
parties assured at national level. 
Single Transferable Vote in multi-
member constituencies. Proportionality 
assured between candidates at 
constituency level, but not between 
parties. 
Votes for party lists in multi-member 
constituencies. Proportionality 
between parties assured at national 
level. 
Votes for party lists in four electoral 
districts, in which proportionality 
between parties assured. Voting 
compulsory. 
Votes for party lists in single national 
constituency. Proportionality 
between parties assured at national 
level. 
Single vote in single-member 
constituencies. One ballot in which 
only simple majority required. 
Proportionality not assured. 
2 to decide  whether extremist parties,  of right or left, 
should be banned? (For example, certain parties are 
still banned in Germany). 
Next, is a uniform voting age, and a uniform age of 
eligibility  for  election,  necessary?  The  1960  draft 
Convention fixed  a common minimum voting age of 
21  and a common minimum age of eligibility of 25. 
The normal voting age today varies between  18  and 
21  in  Member  States  (see  Table  1).  Linked  to  the 
matter of voting age is that of where  the vote may be 
cast. The draft Convention envisaged that nationals of 
Member States  would  only  be  able  to vote in their 
countries of origin, if necessary by post or proxy; but 
there are also  strong arguments for  allowing  Com-
munity migrant workers to vote in their countries of 
residence, at least as far as the European Parliament is 
concerned. 
Then there is the question of whether some degree of 
proportionality  should  be  stipulated.  Would  it  be 
admissible,  for  example,  merely  to  hold  a  single 
national vote,  with the winning party taking all  the 
seats? 
Direct elections also raise the problem of what is to 
be  done  in  the  event  of a  Member  being  no  longer 
willing  or  able  to  retain  his  seat.  In some  Member 
States  a  constituency  by-election  to  elect  a  new 
Member would  be  the  usual practice;  in others the 
delegation would be replenished from the appropriate 
party list. 
There is the question of whether membership of the 
Parliament should be compatible with the holding of 
certain other offices: for example, the 1960 proposals 
excluded members of national governments and of the 
Community Commission. 
Finally, there is the question of cost: how far,  for 
example, should the Community finance elections? In 
some Member States parties are supported by public 
funds, in others not. 
Election dates 
A  more difficult  problem is  that of whether there 
should be a single European election date. One ballot, 
from Jutland to Sicily, would clearly have a dramatic 
impact. On the other hand different political situations 
in Member States might make this difficult to organise. 
Were  it left  to  Member  States  to  arrange  for  the 
election  of  their  delegations  separately,  European 
elections might be combined with national elections. 
This would have some clear advantages: size  of poll 
and  cost,  for  example.  It  would  also  have  clear 
disadvantages: for example, the maximum confusion 
of election issues. 
Eventually,  however,  a  single  election  date  will 
clearly  be  necessary.  As  the  Parliament  acquires 
powers,  the  balance  between  the  political  parties 
represented in it will  become increasingly important, 
and it will no longer be tolerable for the membership-
and possibly the political complexion - of the Parlia-
ment to be constantly changing as  a result of different 
national elections.  The question will then arise as to 
whether the Parliament should have a fixed term: for 
example, the five years proposed in the 1960 Conven-
tion;  or  whether  there  should  be  a  procedure  for 
dissolution in the event of crisis. 
Size and allocation of seats 
Possibly the most thorny problems of  all are the size 
of  the Parliament, and how the seats are to be allocated 
among  Member  States.  Directly electing  the current 
198 Members would mean about 1,250,000 population 
(849,000 registered to vote) for each Member.  How-
ever, if no changes were made in national allocation, 
the number of voters per German Member would be 
some  1,150,000 as compared with only 32,000 in the 
case of  Luxembourg. Why not redistribute the seats on 
the  basis  of population? In this  case,  Luxembourg 
would have, instead of the present six, no seats at all! 
It would become part of some  Belgian,  French  or 
German electoral area. 
To solve  this problem  alone,  there  is  a  case  for 
enlarging the Parliament. The larger the Parliament, 
too,  the easier it will  be  to provide for manageable 
constituencies,  and the  representation  of minorities. 
On the other  hand, there is clearly a point beyond which 
the Parliament would cease to operate as a deliberative 
assembly at all. The 1960 Convention proposed simply 
tripling each national delegation. This solution, today, 
would  give  a  Parliament of 594  seats,  in  which for 
example,  Luxembourg  would  have  18  seats  to 
Germany's 108.  On the other hand, a Parliament of, 
say,  505  allocated  strictly  according  to  population, 
would give Germany 123  seats, Ireland only six seats 
and Luxembourg only one. (See Table 2.) 
The dual mandate 
Although the  present dual  mandate of European 
Parliamentarians  creates  many  problems,  there  are 
good arguments for preserving strong links between 
the European Parliament and the national parliaments. 
The 1960 Convention solution was that, initially, one-
Table 2 
Possible Numbers and Distribution of Seats 
1960 Convention  One Member per  Six per Member  Six per Member 
basis: all  half-million  State + one per  State + one per 
Country  Present  delegations  x  population  half-million  one million 
three  (1972)  population  population 
Germany  36  108  123  129  67 
UK  36  108  111  117  61 
Italy  36  108  108  114  60 
France  36  108  103  109  57 
Netherlands  14  42  26  32  19 
Belgium  14  42  19  25  15 
Denmark  10  30  10  16  11 
Ireland  10  30  6  12  9 
Luxembourg  5  18  (I)  6  6 
TOTAL  197  594  506  560  305 
3 third of  the Parliament should retain the dual mandate, 
and be nominated as at present, while the other two-
thirds should be directly elected and be forbidden to 
hold  the  dual  mandate.  There  are,  however,  other 
possibilities.  For example,  the  dual  mandate  might 
neither  be  made  obligatory  nor be  forbidden  for  a 
wholly directly elected Parliament, it being left up to 
individual  Member States - or individual  MPs - to 
decide whether to hold a dual mandate or not. 
The first election 
The 1960 Convention envisaged that direct elections 
would come in two stages: a transitional period, with 
two-thirds of the Parliament being elected simultane-
ously,  but by different national systems;  and a final 
stage  of full  direct  elections  on  a  single  basis,  the 
details of which would be worked  out by  the elected 
Parliament itself. It has been suggested that use could 
be  made of a  transitional stage  even  as  regards the 
timing  of the  elections.  Individual  Member  States 
might be  required to elect  their delegations  directly 
within a deadline of, say, four years. By the end of this 
period,  the  whole  Parliament  would  have  been 
directly  elected,  albeit  by  different  systems  and  at 
different times. 
Most opinion,  however,  is  in  favour  of a  single 
election date right from the start. 
How quickly could this first election be organised? 
Following the Summit Conference held in Paris during 
December 1974 a communique was issued in which the 
Heads of Government noted: 'that the election of the 
European Assembly by universal suffrage,  one of the 
objectives laid down in the Treaty, should be achieved 
as soon as possible. In this connection, they await with 
interest the proposals on the European Assembly, on 
which they wish  the Council to act in  1976.  On this 
assumption,  elections  by  direct  universal  suffrage 
could take place at any time in or after 1978.' Britain 
and Denmark, however, inserted reservations into the 
communique. 
The longer term: the role of 
parties 
Once these initial elections are out of the way,  the 
job will begin of  transforming the 'uniform procedure' 
into a full  'uniform system  of election'.  How this is 
done will depend very much on the attitude taken by 
the political parties. 
Already,  in  the  present  Parliament,  Members  sit, 
not  in  national  delegations,  but  in  multi-national 
political  groups:  Christian-Democrat,  Socialist, 
Liberal, European Conservative, European Progressive 
Democrat  and  Communist.  (See  ESTS  19  'The 
European  Parliament',  Table  I.)  During the  transi-
tional  stage  of direct  elections  - particularly  if the 
European vote is  held  simultaneously with different 
national elections - there will  not be much scope for 
these groups to fight as single parties, or alliances of 
parties, in different countries.  Once  there is  a  single 
election  date,  however,  genuine  European  parties 
become a possibility. In turn, once there are European 
parties,  it  becomes  possible  to  devise  an  electoral 
system geared less  to national identities and more to 
political tendency. 
One  major  issue  this  raises  is  the  degree  of 
proportionality any European electoral system should 
have.  Here,  the practices of different  Member States 
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indicate sharp differences of approach. The majority 
of States place emphasis on reflecting exactly in their 
national parliaments the proportions of  votes received 
by  the different political parties.  In other states  the 
emphasis  is  not  on  parties,  but  on  individual 
candidates,  and  on  links  between  Members  and 
particular geographical constituencies. 
It is possible to ensure proportionality, however, at 
different levels of an electoral system: at constituency 
level  through  multi-member  constituencies  (though 
the  Irish  single  transferable  vote  system  ensures 
proportionality  between  candidates  rather  than 
parties);  and  at regional  or national  level  through 
party  lists.  The  German  system  combines  simple 
majority, single-member constituencies with a national 
result fully proportional between parties. 
With European parties it would also be possible to 
secure  proportionality  at a  Community  level.  Thus 
those  individual  States  which  prefer  a  constituency 
system might be able to retain it, with European party 
lists  ensuring that voters'  political  preferences  were 
reflected exactly in the Parliament itself. 
What would be the results? 
Politicians are unlikely to rush into any system for 
direct elections, though, until they have some idea of 
what the results will be. The present multi-party 'status 
quo'  could  seem  preferable  to  a  Parliament  totally 
dominated  by  one  political  tendency.  However, 
research  by  Professor  Richard  Rose  of Strathclyde 
University  in  Scotland  has  revealed  that  direct 
elections,  whatever  the  allocation  of representation 
between  Member  States,  would  probably  produce 
political groups of almost the same relative strengths 
as  at  present.  Only  the  Communists  would  get  a 
major change in representation - up by  5 per cent. 
Naturally,  it would  always  be  possible  for a  single 
political party to 'win' an election,  but this  is  what 
democracy  is  all  about.  The  substance  within  the 
framework  of  eventual  European  Union  should 
ultimately  be  decided  by  the  political  will  of the 
people; and it is through direct elections that this will 
can best be given a voice. 
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East-West Relations in Europe II 
Charles Ransom 
In the preceding article ( ESTS 19) an attempt was made to identify some develop-
ments in relations between Western and Eastern Europe where, in the course of  the last 
two  decades,  both sides have come to accept that the threat of destruction by nuclear 
weapons is an enormously powerful deterrent to war in Europe and have been hoping for 
a positive outcome to  the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the  USA 
and USSR. 
In the course of  the brief  survey it was concluded that as a result of  this approach 
progress  has  been  made  towards  better  relationships  between  governments  but  that 
detente and co-existence as we have known them are still negative and leave the peoples of 
the two halves of the continent divided by visible and invisible barriers.  In the present 
article  some  consideration  is  given  to  other  developments  which  might  conceivably 
overcome  this  state  of affairs  by presenting  governments  with  facts  as  apparently 
unalterable as those posed by the threat of  nuclear war. 
Trade  Table 2 
Perhaps  the  most important of the  developments 
which seem to indicate improved relationships can be 
found in the field of  economic links between the states 
of Western and Eastern Europe. No basic ideological 
objection is  raised by either side here, for such links 
are potentially a source of  increased economic welfare. 
Trade of East European countries with Western 
Europe and of some West European countries 
with Eastern Europe as a percentage of their total 
trade in 1971 
In the  past two  decades  the  value  of total  trade 
between Western and Eastern Europe (calculated by 
adding the value of exports from Western to Eastern 
Europe  to  the  value  of exports  from  Eastern  to 
Western Europe) has grown substantially, as Table 1 
demonstrates. 
The importance of East-West trade to some of the 
principal  European  nations  can  be  deduced  from 
Table  2  which  shows  that  the  pattern  differs 
considerably from one country to another. 
Exports to 
Eastern Europe  Western Europe 
Bulgaria  14·9 
Czechoslovakia  22·6 
GDR  23·1 
Hungary  26·1 
Poland  27·0 
Rumania  34·8 
USSR  19·1 
Exports to 
Western Europe  Eastern Europe 
Federal Republic of 
Germany  3·9 
France  3·5 
Italy  4·9 
UK  2·8 
Austria  12·2 
Finland  14·0 
Yugoslavia  36·4 
Average for Western 
Europe as a whole  4·1 
Imports from 
Western Europe 
17·1 
25·5 
26·1 
26·9 
25·8 
36·5 
19·3 
Imports from 
Eastern Europe 
3·7 
2·7 
5·6 
3·6 
9·1 
17·9 
23·7 
4·1 
The main economic  motives  which lie  behind the 
growth of East-West trade are,  on the Western side, 
the search for new markets by industrial producers and 
on the Eastern side the desire to obtain technologically 
advanced  industrial  products,  especially  machinery. 
These two motives have played, and are playing,  an 
important part in another form ofEast-Westeconomic 
relationship namely - industrial co-operation between 
enterprises  in  Western  and  Eastern  Europe for  the 
joint production of manufactured goods,  usually  in 
the East European country concerned. There are now 
Polish as well as Soviet-built Fiat cars and in a year or 
Sources:  United  National  Economic  Bulletin  for 
Europe. Vol. 23  No. 2 and Vol. 24 No.  1. 
Table 1 
Growth of East-West Trade 
Year  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973 
------------------------
$M  3372  3771  4527  4824  5239  5635  6050  7010  8050  8920  9550  10610  11300  13800  16050  * 
*Full information not yet published but as West European exports to Eastern Europe rose from $8,050m in 1972 
to $11 ,400m in 1973 the total is likely to be above $20,000m. 
Source: United National Monthly Bulletin of Statistics Special Tables. 
1 so there will be Polish-built Massey-Ferguson tractors; 
Rumania  builds  Renault  cars  using  some  French 
components;  the  Hungarians  are  to  be  the  sole 
manufacturers of a four-wheel drive Volvo jeep; and 
the  West  German  company  Anker  has  arranged 
integrated  production  lines  for  cash  registers  in 
Austria,  Hungary and  Czechoslovakia.  Many  other 
examples could be  cited.  These arrangements, which 
involve technological transfers and, very often, joint 
participation  in  management,  augment  the  flow  of 
goods and services between East and West and bring 
considerable numbers of people from both halves  of 
the continent together.! 
Closer  economic  relations  have  increased  the 
number of  contracts between businessmen, technicians 
and managers  of East and West  who  meet  for  the 
purpose  of  producing  goods  and  services.  One 
beneficial  effect  is  to establish  new  areas  of mutual 
interest,  to  extend  knowledge  of differing  rules  of 
behaviour  and  to improve  at least  one  channel  of 
communication between the two halves of Europe. 
Whether the growth of  these relationships represents 
an  irreversible  trend  to  which  both  sides  must  of 
necessity remain committed and by which governments 
will be carried along despite their political differences 
is,  however, an open question.  (See  insert East-West 
Relations  - 'Trade  leaps  the  ideological  barriers', 
'More commercial links'.) 
It would  be  rash  to prophesy  that  the  scale  of 
interchange between Eastern and Western Europe will 
necessarily grow at a sharply-increasing rate: if  it does 
not do so the scale will still be comparatively small by 
world standards for many years to come. At the present 
time  the  degree  of  interdependence  between  the 
economies of Eastern and Western Europe is certainly 
not so great that either side would suffer disaster if the 
exchanges  were  to stop altogether,  although several 
of the  smaller  states,  expecially  in Eastern  Europe, 
would experience some hardship. For rapid growth to 
continue, governments must give encouragement and 
the decision to do so is partly political. 
Economic  relations  are not yet  strong enough  (if 
they  ever  will  be)  to  affect  to  any  great  extent  the 
politics of the European situation. Nor does historical 
experience  offer  irrefutable  proof that  nations  will 
have good political relations with each other merely 
because  their  economic  relations  are  good.2  Never-
theless,  in spite of these reservations,  the growth of 
economic links can be considered to be a step forward 
on the human plane. 
Environment 
Another matter of major concern  to the  modern 
world is the condition of the environment. To an even 
greater extent than the common problem of  improving 
economic  welfare  this  might  appear  to  be  of such 
importance  as  to  draw  governments  and  peoples 
together  into  a  natural  alliance,  transcending 
differences  of  political  systems,  to  combat  the 
deterioration of the earth on which we all live. 
Study of environmental problems is of course being 
undertaken  throughout  the  world  and  the  United 
I  The tlow of technology is not always one way. For example, William Old Ltd. 
(London), have recently purchased the technology for the manufacture of  hearing-
aid batteries from a Hungarian firm. 
2 For a discussion of  some aspects of this question see 'Is trade the key to a better 
world?' 'Europea' Vol. II No. 1 October 1974. 
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Nations  has  a  programme  intended  to  affect  all 
nations.  In  Western  Europe,  in  addition  to  the 
national  programmes  of  its  Member  States,  the 
Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and 
Development (OECD) established in 1970 an Environ-
ment  Committee  to  provide  governments  with 
information.  In  Eastern  Europe  the  Council  for 
Mutual  Economic  Assistance  (COMECON)  began 
joint work  on the  protection  of water  resources  in 
1962.  Since then its industrial Standing Commission 
responsible for engineering, chemicals, iron and steel 
have been charged with responsibility for studying and 
making recommendations to combat the air pollution 
effects of  the industries in question, while the Standing 
Commission on construction concerns itself with town 
planning. 
Some of the most vigorous efforts to stimulate an 
international  approach  to  environmental  problems 
have  been  made  by  the  United  Nations  Economic 
Commission for Europe (ECE). Founded in 1946 this 
organisation is  still the only true example of an all-
European body, embracing as it does virtually all the 
nations  of Western  and  Eastern  Europe.  Its  main 
concern is  with economic  research and consultation 
but it has  also  taken  a  lead  among  other  United 
Nations organisations in the study of environmental 
questions.  For example,  some years ago it produced 
common  standards  for  vehicle-exhaust  pollution. 
These  have  not,  however,  been  adopted  by  all  the 
Member  States  and,  having  no  executive  powers, 
ECE cannot enforce its recommendations. 
It may  be  a  sign  that the impact  of this  general 
concern  for  the  environment  upon  international 
political  conduct  is  still  comparatively  slight  that 
when  in June  1972  the  United Nations held a  con-
ference  on the  Human  Environment  at Stockholm, 
the USSR and all the East European states, with the 
exception of Rumania, decided to absent themselves 
because  no  invitation  had  been  issued  to  East 
Germany,  which  was  not  then  a  member  of the 
United Nations. Whatever the rights and wrongs of  the 
political dispute may have been, the conclusion seems 
inescapable that at that time the USSR and the East 
European states considered it more important to make 
a political case than to assist in the work of the con-
ference.  No doubt a year or so  in a matter of such 
long-term significance is unimportant and it may well 
be that in future Soviet priorities will change, but the 
conflict over membership of the Stockholm conference 
Comecon in first formal contact with Community 
The first formal contact between a Common 
Market institution and one from Comecon took 
place  unannounced  in  Luxembourg  this  week 
(December 4,  1974). 
In spite  of continued  delays  in  preparing  a 
meeting between the Comecon Secretariat and 
the  EEC  Commission  here,  a  delegation  from 
Comecon's International Investment Bank was 
received at the Luxembourg headquarters of the 
EEC's European Investment Bank on Monday. 
The Comecon bank's delegation was headed by 
Mr S. Kobak, a Polish vice-president. 
The EEC has so far reacted coolly to advances 
by  Comecon,  which  has  been  pushing  for  a 
dialogue with the Community for the past year. ' 
shows that concern with the environment has not yet 
reached the  stag~ where it occupie_s a le~ding position 
in political decision-makjng. One day it may do so and 
add another dimension to international co-operation 
in a matter of common concern to all mankind. It  will 
thereby extend the field of contacts between people in 
Eastern and Western Europe as citizens of the world. 
Economics and environmental questions have been 
chosen as examples of  matters in which purely political 
or ideological questions might be  expected to play a 
secondary role. Although the promise they contain is 
not yet  fulfilled  it is  still alive.  But even  when  rein-
forced by inter-governmental cultural agreements, and 
such arrangements as  those between Universities for 
the  exchange  of staff  and  students,  the  East-West 
contacts arising from the growth of common interest 
in  the  large  issues  mentioned  above  still  affects 
comparatively  limited  groups  of  specialists.  The 
development  of tourism,  mostly  from  Western  to 
Eastern  Europe,  has  in  recent years  brought about 
some enlargement of  contacts between ordinary people 
but the opening up of  the free exchange of  peoples and 
ideas between the two halves of  Europe is still delayed. 
Security and co-operation 
It is  probable  that in  the  course  of time  social 
changes, such as  those brought about by the general 
possession of cars and television sets in all European 
countries,  will  tend to generate a pressure of public 
opinion against the barriers which still exist between 
the free flow of people and ideas within the continent 
as a whole. Meanwhile, as the record of  the Conference 
on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSE) shows, 
if the nations of Eastern and Western Europe attempt 
to confront this problem by formal intergovernmental 
discussion, underlying political differences make their 
appearance and retard progress to a snail's pace. (See 
insert  East-West  Relations  - 'Lifting  the  Iron 
Curtain'.) 
The CSE proceedings began with preparatory talks 
at Otaniemi, Finland in November 1972.  In July  1973 
the Foreign Ministers of the participating states met in 
conference in Helsinki and the matters under discus-
sion were  then referred to a Committee stage which 
began in Geneva in August 1973 with the possibility in 
mind  that a  final  meeting  of heads  of governments 
would  assemble  in  due  course  to  sign  agreed 
documents. In October 1974 the Committee  stage  is 
still unfinished and the final meeting seemingly far off. 
The idea of holding a security conference originated 
in Eastern Europe and the effective starting point of 
the conference which met in Finland was a declaration 
issued  by the East European states  at Bucharest in 
July 1966. The Bucharest declaration was followed in 
March  1969  by  a  'Message  from  the  Warsaw  Pact 
States  to  all  European  Countries',  issued  from 
Budapest, and by a communique of the Warsaw Pact 
after a meeting of its leaders in Prague in October of 
the same year.  The Budapest communique proposed 
that the two main items for the agenda should concern 
(a) European Security and (b) the expansion of trade, 
economic, scientific and technical relations 'aimed at 
the  development  of  political · co-operation  among 
European states'. 
At  their  meeting  in  Washington  in  April  1969 
NATO  Ministers  responded  to  this  initiative  by 
agreeing to explore issues  which might profitably be 
discussed with the USSR and the East European states 
3 
bilaterally and a year later, at their meeting in Rome 
in March 1970, declared themselves ready to examine 
the possibility of holding a general conference.  They 
suggested that one of the most important matters for 
discussion should be 'the development of  international 
relations  with  a  view  to  contributing  to  the  freer 
movement  of people,  ideas  and information and to 
developing  co-operation  in  the  cultural,  economic, 
technical and scientific fields,  as well as in the field  of 
the human environment'. 
The  words  'freer movement  of people,  ideas  and 
information'  in  the  NATO  proposal  aroused  con-
siderable  suspicion  in  the  USSR  and  elsewhere  in 
Eastern  Europe  on  the  grounds  that  they  implied 
interference in Eastern European affairs and although 
the NATO Ministers used them again at this meeting 
in Brussels in December 1971  there was  no response 
from  Eastern  Europe  until  January  1973  when  the 
preparatory  talks  for  the  Conference  were  already 
taking place in Finland. The USSR then amended its 
own draft agenda for the Conference by including the 
extension of cultural contacts, on condition that they 
complied with the laws and social philosophies of the 
participating states. Eventually the third items on the 
agenda (known as 'Basket 3') covered in very general 
language the dissemination of information and freer 
contacts between people. 
At the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Helsinki 
in  July  1973  when  the  Western  States  put forward 
various  suggestions  for  securing freer  movement  of 
people, ideas and information - including some from 
the British  Government  for  the  free  circulation  of 
newspapers,  linked  television  programmes  and  the 
publication of a European magazine - Mr Gromyko, 
the Soviet Foreign Minister, in his  speech gave great 
emphasis to the observance of the existing laws  and 
traditions of the States concerned. Transferred to the 
Committee stage in Geneva, Basket 3 immediately ran 
into trouble from which, despite minor concessions by 
both sides, it has not yet emerged. The principal point 
of contention has been the extent to which the flow of 
people, ideas and information should be controlled by 
governments, the Eastern side pressing for much more 
than  is  acceptable  to  the  Western  side.  (See  insert 
East-West Relations- 'The fine print of detente'.) 
Two kinds of  comment on the deadlock are possible. 
A pessimistic  one is  that here,  at the  very  heart of 
detente, we are faced by an unbridgeable gulf between 
political philosophies.  The other,  more optimistic, is 
that deadlock of this sort is typical of nearly all East-
West negotiations, because the Russians in particular 
are notoriously hard bargainers, and that in the end 
some  compromise  will  emerge  representing  another 
inch of progress along the road towards a more open 
European  society.  The  present  author  is  inclined 
somewhat towards the second view. 
Detente or delusion 
Where progress is so slow, uncertain and difficult it 
is  natural that some writers on the whole  subject of 
detente should hold deeply pessimistic opinions about 
it, going so far as to argue that detente is an illusion 
fostered by the USSR in order to weaken the will of 
Western nations to preserve their own liberal institu-
tions and lull them into a naive acceptance of Soviet 
policies) What, however,  could be the alternative to 
3  For a forceful exoression of this argument see Leo Labedz' article 'Detente or 
Deception?' International Review No. I Spring 1974. detente in a nuclear age? If  there are dangers such as 
those suggested by the more pessimistic students of  the 
subject the right way to meet them can hardly be to 
turn a  blind eye  or to  treat the whole  matter with 
cynicism  or indifference.  What is  needed is  (a),  that 
public opinion should begin to play a larger part than 
it  has  hitherto  in  the  debate  and  (b),  that  public 
opinion should be well-informed. In the last analysis 
powerful public opinion in both Western and Eastern 
Europe in favour of dismantling the barriers to free 
communication  could  present  governments  with  as 
crucial a set of  circumstances as any encountered since 
the war. 
To this it may be objected that under authoritarian 
regimes like those of Eastern Europe public opinion 
can  be  so  easily  controlled  that  it  has  almost  no 
independent political effect. It is  true that we  in the 
West do not yet fully understand how public opinion 
works in Eastern Europe but a case could be made for 
believing that on issues of major importance it has in 
recent  years  been  taken  very  seriously  by  the  East 
European governments. To cite one example: public 
discontent with Stalin's methods of government was 
an  important  factor  in  bringing  about  reforms 
throughout Eastern Europe in the years immediately 
following his death. 
Conclusion 
The  expectations  of people  everywhere  of better 
economic  circumstances  for  themselves  and  their 
families affects Eastern as well as Western Europe and 
has been one of  the spurs to experiments in new forms 
of  economic management which have been going on in 
Eastern  Europe  in  the  past  dozen  years.  If public 
opinion about the political situation in Europe were 
to become as influential as it has been about economic 
policy it could play an important part in healing the 
division of Europe. It may well be that public opinion 
will  form  more  slowly  in  Eastern  than  in  Western 
Europe but if this is so there is all the more reason for 
Western opinion to give a lead. 
For such a lead to be effective requires as a minimum 
that West European public opinion should be based 
on as good a knowledge as it is possible to acquire of 
the  purposes  and  methods  of the  East  European 
societies,  of their successes  and failures.  Since  com-
munication between the two halves of Europe is  still 
restricted it is not easy, even for specialist students in 
the West to acquire all the information needed to form 
the basis of an objective opinion. 
Secondly, it seems to the present  writer  that well 
informed public opinion in the West needs to consider 
the effect of the image of Western Europe upon public 
opinion in Eastern Europe. Hard line propagandists in 
Eastern Europe seek to present Western Europe as a 
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society not only inequitable but unstable - a  society 
which must collapse under the stress of  its own internal 
contradictions.  To  the  extent  that  the  liberal 
institutions of Western Europe fail to secure orderly 
economic  growth,  rational  political  processes  and 
social justice without detriment to the liberty of the 
individual,  they  strengthen the hands  of ideological 
extremists in Eastern Europe. To the extent that our 
institutions provide an attractive model of successful 
liberal  and democratic political  behaviour they  will 
strengthen  the  hands  of the  vast  numbers  in  East 
Europe who are not extremists but who, in the course 
of  time, could create the body of  public opinion in that 
part  of Europe  actively  seeking  for  an  open,  all-
European society. 
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See also 'East-West Relations 1', ESTS 19. Trade leaps the ideological barriers 
By JONATHAN  STEELE  s:: 
.9 
Treaty  of  Rome  defin'ing  the  su1ts  and  cameras, but of refri- many's  trade.  For  West  Ger· plastics.  Last year produced an  There is now some muttering  .~ 
trade as  mternal  German trade  gerators  and  typewriters  too.  many,  on  the  other  hand.  Its  East  German  deficit  of  about amhng  other  EEC  members  E 
and  exempt  from  EEC  tanffs.  This anonymous labelling has  Eastern  neighbour  is  propnr- £80  millions  with  the  Com- particularly  Holland,  Belgium  "-
East  Germany  benefits  by  caused  occasional  problems  m  twnatcl;v  I c s s  important, mumsts  unable  to  sell  enough an'd  France.  But  it  is  not  ~ 
havmg  privileged  access  to  the  West  Germany.  Last  summer  accounhn!Z for JUSt  uncter 2  per goods  to  pay  for  thCJr  hungry  entirely clear whether they are  .,., 
Common  Market  dented  to  the  vineyard  owners  there  were  cent  of  Its  total  world  trade.  purchases of capital goods from  angry at East Germany's special  ..o 
rest  of  Eastern  Europe  while  urging the Federal Government But  Bonn  would  like  to  West Germany.  This is  thought  access  to  the  Common  Market  ~ 
West Germany has a  he~d start  to demand accurate Iabellmg of  mcrease  trade  for  political  to  be  one  reason .why the East  or  jealous  of  West  Germany's  t-. 
over 1ts  Western competitors in  the  "sekt,"  that  is  German  ~easons as a  way of  strE'ngthen·  German  authorities .  are  now  share  of  the  East  German  ....; 
East  Germany.  West  German  champagne,  coming  in  from  mg  tJes  between  the  two  plannmg a  dramatic mcrease m  market.  ~ 
Importers can  also  exploit East  East Germany.  Smce  East Ger- Gcrmanys.  theJr  production  of  consumer  At  the  moment  the  Federal  ~ 
Germany's  lower  labour  costs  many's vineyards  are not noted  The  trade  is  still  conducted goods-as .  "money "  to  con- Republic  sells  East  Germany  s:: 
by  buying  goods  which  can  for  their size,  it was  suspected  on  a  bilateral  and  mainly tmue  buymg  from  the  West.  about  four  times  as  much  as  .S 
then be sold as German Without  that  the  East  Germans  had  barter  basis,  as  is  common  in  Whichever  side  benefits  the original five  other members  'E 
consumers  knowmg  where  they  become  shrewd students  of the  most  East-West  trade.  But  in economically  most  from  the  of the EEC put together. Nor is  !: 
come  from.  international  jungfE>  of  wine- the  case  of  Imbalances.  Bonn trade,  it  is  West  Germany  it  clear  how  far  Bonn's  EEC  .. 
Just  as  many  British  im- labelling in the  West and were  has  authorised  the  award  of whtch  attaches  most  pohtical  partners will take the issue.  C!> 
porters  use  the  label  "Empire  simply  bottling  sekt. made  in  mtercst-free  credits  to  East significance  to  it.  On  Bonn's  The ending of the diplomatic  (I) 
made"  to  concea·I  the  exact  Hungary,  B u I gar  I a,  and  Germany.  Another  special insistence,  the  recently-signed  boycott  of  East  Germany  is  .t! 
origm  of  goods,  West  German  Rumanta.  adva~tage wh1ch  East Germany basic  treaty  between  them  likely  to lead to an  increa.se  in  E-o 
1mporters have been afraid that  Trade  between  the  two  Ger- ~as Is  that  Bonn  buys  most  of specifies that trade w11l  develop  trade  for  every  Western  E 
people  might  be  reluctant  to  manys  has  been  increasing  Its  agncultural  exports  .as" on  t~~ bas1s  of existing agree·  country: Bi!t  in  the short term  f: 
buy  goods  labelled  as  East  steadily and its annual turnover  though  they  were  ~ommun.lty ments.  the  ma~n 1ssue  for  East  Ger- ..._ 
German.  .  now  exceeds  £500  millions.  It produ~ts  at  EEC  ~rices  which  Bonn  is  anxious  to  maintain  !Uany  .Is  t.o  find  a  way  of  '1::! 
One  third  of  East  Germa.n  has  almost  doubled  m  the past  are  0  ten  su~stantlally  higher them  as  a  symbol  of  the  mcreasmg  1ts  own  exports  to  ~ 
exports to the Federal Republ!c  four  years.  West  Germany  is  than world prices.  "special relationship" which it  West Germany.  ::s 
back  to  the  1951  are  now  consumer  goods  and  now  East  Germany's  best  trad- In  return  for  farm  products, wants  to  maintain  with  the  '1::! 
Agreement clothmg.  Some  of  th1s  year's  ing.  partner  afte_r  the  Sovie.t  consumer  goods  and  raw other  Germany  but  which  the  f: 
jlbl;eq·uer1tly  recog- tourists  may  be  unconsciOus  Umon.  It  provides  approx1- materials,  West Germany sends East,  at  least  ideologically,  ~ 
annexe  to  the owners not JUSt  of East German  mate}y 10  per cent of East Ger- mamly  machmery,  steel,  and denies.  r:t: 
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>lems  are 
reduced,  the basic  problem re-
mains  that  everything  which 
East  Europe  imports  from  the 
West must ·be  paid for by s.ome-
thing ebe that is  exported, and 
hitherto  there  have  ~imply not 
been  enough  goods  that  "the 
West  really  ,,,.ants  to puy  from 
the  East. 
Not  surprisingly  •.  the  imme-
diate  pr·ospects  f·or  Eas•t-We!'.t 
trade are regarded fairly soberly 
in  tht:  latest report  on the sub-
ject by the Cnite'd Nation~ Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe. 
It says  that a  continued  accel-
eration of exports from Western 
to  Eastern  Europe  cannot  be 
relied  on  since  the Ea:-.t  Euro-
pean  authorities  are  ttying  to 
improve  their balance of trade 
by  reducing  imports.  A  great 
deal o.f  the future e~pansion of 
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East  Europe's  trade  will  be 
within Comecon. it  says. Trade 
in  machinery  between  the 
Soviet  Union  and  individual 
Com~Xon countries  should  in-
cre<~.;,c  by  50  to 100  per cent. 
of  the  Common  Market  bas 
also  shown  up  the  relative 
weakness  and  disarrav  of  the 
Eao;t  European countries. 
Inte~ration  and  r~Xentraliza­
tion  are  indeed the watchwords 
in  Comecon  now,  pa,rtly  be-
cause  of the  difficulties  of ex-
porting  enough  to  the  West. 
partly  because more industrial 
goods are needed for the  home 
market, and  partly for political 
reas.ons.  The  Czcchoslov:1k 
events of 1968 and pwbably the 
Poli-;'h  events.  of last  De~ember 
have  made  tl1e  Ru~ians. more 
afra1d of the  disper~ion of poli-
Ncal  power \Vhich  tend~>  to  fol-
low  from  economk  decentrali-
zation  and the competitton for 
western  markets.  The  progress 
Hence  there is  growing pres-
!>ure from Russia and .from more 
mthodox count-ries such as East 
Germany  for  intensifed  co-
op·eration  within  Comecon-
consultations  on  long-term 
planning  and  investment, 
specialization. and &o  on. 
Jn  the  short term,  therefore. 
the growth of East-'West trade is 
likely  to  proceed  at  a  fairly 
Je-i-,urely  pace.  For the Soviet 
Union. ·large and relatively se.Jf-
suf.ficient. it is not an absolutely 
vital  interest,  but Soviet leaders 
have  r~Xent1y  been  showing 
themselves more  realistic  about 
.the different needs of their EaM 
European allies. 
Reservations  may  persist  on  .s 
the  political  effects  of western  .~ 
economic  infiuence,  and  poli·  E 
tical  upheavals  such  as  the  ~ 
CzechoStl'ovak  can  always check  Q. 
the  trend  to  East-West  inter·  £ 
dependence.  T'he  proliferation  ..., 
of industrial cooperation agree- ~ 
ments,  nevertheless,  testifies  to  a; 
a shared expectation of political  ..... 
peace, trust and continuity.  In  ~ 
particu)ar,  East  Germany.  E 
which  politically  has  the most  ~ 
to  fear  from  western  penetra- (I) 
tion,  maintains a  high  turnover  t; 
of trade  with  West Gennatw.  E 
In  the  long  run,  therefore.  .g 
East-West  trade  seems  bound  '1::! 
to  develop.  Both  sides  have an  ~ 
interest  m  1t.  and  proximity  ::s 
ai·one  is  a  powerful  factor.  ~ 
R.D.  ~ EAST WEST RELATIONS 
EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE 
The fine print of detente 
BY  MALCOLM RUTHERFORD 
DR.  HENRY  KISSINGER,  no 
less,  says he fails  to understand 
the  European  Security  Con-
ference  (CSE)  To  which  the 
delegations,  beavering  away  in 
Geneva,  reply:  " It's  because  he 
hasn't  read  the  papers."  Dr. 
Kissinger  apparently  admits 
this,  but  says  he  doesn't  want 
to  read  the  papers  because 
there  are  altogether  too  many 
of  them. 
Dr.  Kissinger has a  point. The 
CSE has become so bogged down 
under  papeT  work  that  even  if 
there  were  an  immediate  d('Ci· 
sion to tie it all  up, it could take 
a  good  two  months.  The  final 
document  could  run  to  several 
thousand  words.  every  one  of 
them. including the punctuatiOn, 
processed  and  reprocessed, 
translated  anr!  retranslated,  by 
the  35  delegations  Smce  one 
of  the  o):Jjectives  is  that  this 
should  be  published  and  made 
widelv  availahlP  to  inform  thl' 
man  in  the street of the  human 
benefits  of  East-West  detente', 
one mav doubt h•  w many people 
are  going  to  read  it. 
Stage  two  of  the  Conff'rence 
has  just  adjourned  for  the 
~ummer recess  on  a  relatively 
optimistic note.  .Just  before the 
adjournment-and  indeed  after 
some delegates had already gone 
home or at least completed their 
final  reports-the Soviet  delega-
tion came through with some of 
the  concessions  for  which  the 
Conference  had  been  waiting 
since  Easter.  The  immediate 
reaction  in  the  Western  camp 
was one of intense irritation that 
the Russians had delayed so long, 
but  the  result  is  that  there  is 
now  agreement  on  a  formula 
which  should allow the  Rus~ians 
to make concessions on  the freer 
movement  of  peopll'  and  ideas 
without  fearing  that  their  own 
rights to make their own  legisla· 
tion  will  be  undermined. 
..\ereed  preamble 
Thanks largely  to  the  work  of 
the  neutrals  (Sweden.  SwltZN· 
·land. J:o~m!and and Au~trw  ).  then• 
w1ll  hr  ...  nreamhle  to  Ba,kt•l  :1, 
wh1cl!  rle.tls  w1th  the  human 
relations element of the Confer· 
ence.  It states that the  partici-
pating  countries  recognise  each 
other's rights to choose 'their own 
political,  economic,  social  and 
cultural  systems  and  to  deter-
mine their own laws and regula· 
tions.  But  it  adds  that,  i-n 
exercising these rights, countries 
will  conform  with  their  legal 
obligations  under  international 
law  and  will  pay  due  regard  to 
the final  document or documents 
emerging from the CSE. 
Coming  on  the  last  day,  the 
agreement was  the most positive 
result  of  a  session  which  began 
m  April  in  the  hope  that  the 
entire Conference would  be com-
plete  by  mid-July.  Previously 
the  Western  powers  had  feared 
that  any  preamble  to  Basket  3 
acceptable  to  the  Russians 
would  effectively  nulltfy  the 
contents, while the Russians had 
argued  that  without  agreement 
on  a  preamble it  wa~ tmposstble 
for the sub-committees.  who  are 
working  on  specific  propo>als  to 
improve human contact' b!'tween 
East and West, to  mak('  an~· pro-
gress.  The  merit  of  the  agrct-d 
preamble is that it should create 
the  framework  for  the  sub-
committees  to  go  ahead  more 
productively at the  next sessiOn. 
As  the  delegates  adjourned, 
the  state  of  play  in  the  various 
Baskets  was  as  follows :  There 
has  been  slow  but  steady  pro-
gress  in  drafti'ng  a  declaration 
of  principles  guidmg  the 
relations  between  participating 
countries which will form a large 
part  of  Basket  1.  There  is  pr.o· 
visional  agreement  on  the 
"invwlabiltty  of  frontiers," 
which  for  the  Russians  was  one 
of  the  maiD  anns  of  the  ron· 
ference.  though  the  West  Ger-
mans  will  see  to  It  that  there 
will  t'le  an  e'cape  elause  allow-
ing  for  " peaceful  change." 
In  the  'ame  basket~ there  ha~ 
been  the  flutter  of  a  movement 
on  ronfidence-building  mea~urP~ 
(CB!·.b),  wh1ch  are  the  only 
el<•ment  of  the  \.SE  dealmg 
directly  w1th  seeunty.  The 
Rnss1ans  hav<'  a~cPpted  the 
pnnc1ple  of  trnli~n;.:  o11t~IC!P 
observers  to  m!IJtary  m~nneu\fes. 
~y  remain  extremely  chary  of 
w~stern  proposals  that  advance 
notice  should  be  given  of 
maho.euvres  anywhere  in  Europe 
affecting  12,000  men  or  more, 
though the West has lowered  the 
demand from  60  to  49  days. 
Basket  2  is  concerned  with 
economic,  scientific  and  tech-
nological  co-operation  and  has 
proved  much  easier.  But  there 
has been no  agreement on most-
favoured  nation  status  nor  on 
reciprocity,  anrl  thi-tt .. may  prove 
impossible. 
There are four sub-committees 
working  on  Basket  3:  on  human 
contacts,  exchange  of  informa-
tion,  culture  and  education. 
Progress  has  been  minimal  ar;r{ 
not  long  ago  little  more  thari  :f 
page  of  text  on  the  questiOn  d 
reunification  of  families  con-
tained  as  many  as  30  square 
brarkets.  Basket  4.  which  con-
cerns  a  possible  follow·HJt>  to 
to  the  Conference,  is  vHtually 
empty, though there  is  a Damsh 
proposal to allow  a  probatwn~••' 
period  to  see  if the  results  ,,;  ~ 
being  observed,  and  the.~.  Ph-
haps move on  to somc-tt''"  ·!  r 
The  conference  will  resume 
in  early  September  with  the 
focus  on  trymg  to  fill  up 
Basket 3,  but  before  then  there 
will  be  a  meeting  of  the  mne 
Common  Market  members  in 
Par1s  and  of  the  NATO 
permanent  council  in  Brussels 
-the  two  fora  where  the 
Western position is  co-ordinated. 
These meetings will  consider Dr. 
Kissinger's  suggestion  that  the 
West has  been  settmg  its sights 
too  high  and  may  endanger 
detente hy  seeking the unattain-
able.  The  conclusion  of  most 
Western  delegations.  including 
the  American.  is  that  they  will 
review  the  work  so  far  and 
decide  their  aims  are  entir<>lv 
realistic.  Hence  the  onm  will 
be  hack  on  the  Russian'  to 
deliver  on  Basket  ~-
With ·the prPamhle, the frame-
work  1s  ·  c!'rtainl•·  thPn' 
De!Pgates  will  sC'ek  to  agreP  en 
such  flUestwns  as  the  umfi•·a· 
tlon  of  famillPS.  crnss-fronti"r 
marna.~P  w1der  ac<'c~s  to 
information  and  multiple  vi:--;" 
for  journalists.  The  general 
Western  assqmption  is  that  the· 
Russians  will  yield  in  the  end 
because  they  have  always 
attached great importance to the 
Conference and  are prepared to 
pay  a  price  for  the  agreement 
on  the  inviolability  of  frontiers. 
The stage would then be set for 
Stage Three  which  the  Russians 
have  always insisted should take 
the  form  af .d  35-nation  summit 
meeting.  The  Western  view  is 
that  the  level  of  Stage  Three 
should depend  on the results of 
Stage  Two. 
Hostility 
Although  it  may  not  be  Dr. 
Kissinger's  ideal  approach  to 
diplomacy,  the  Conference  has 
established  at  least  two  things. 
One  is  the  political  unity of  the 
Common  Market  members, 
which  in  this  case  has  been  r:: 
remarkable.  The  leader  of  one  .sa 
~~~~~~;~;e  of  s~i~oper~~~n  h~~~  ·~ 
had  made it  much easier for  the  ,_ 
Nine  to  pursue  the  European  <~~ 
dialogue with  the Arabs,  despite  Q, 
initial  American  hostility..  The  ?> 
other  is  that  the  Soviet  ability  .o 
to  control  the  diplomacy  of  its  ~ 
allies  is  as  firm  as  ever.  Since  oci 
~~e  ~~~!i~~~gea  o~et~re  ~~~~e~~~~~·  c-i 
have  been  virtually  no  '.!ases  ~ 
of  other  Eastern  European.  E 
countries  coming  up  with  ·-
initiatives  of  their  own.  They  E-o 
watch  the  Russians,  it  is  said,  ] 
anc'l  do  as  they are  told.  u 
The  Conference  may  still  fail,  r:: 
for  all  agreements  on  the  ~ 
~~~t~~~~i~to~~f  ~~P:;:~:mbea~~~t~  ri; 
the  whole.  which  is  another  way  ~ 
of  stressing  the  importance  of  E-o 
~a~~ft  ~
3 ~cc~:J~ ~~~r~o~~~\~~i  ~:;  E 
delegate.  who  has  hPPn  part  of  l 
the  Conf('rPncr  throughout.  says 
the  Rus<;ians  will  comr  through  ~ 
w1th  the1r  nPxt  conrp-;qons  as  -
late  as  poss1ble-nrobahiy  on  ;:s 
Chnstmas  Eve  ThPre  \vould  'tl 
stlil  bp  a  lot  of  paprr  work  to  E 
wrap  up.  but  Sta~P Thrpe  could  ~ 
ta"e  place  early  next  year.  0:: 
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More commercial links will be forged in the Ion~ 
At the height of the cold war it 
was  easv  to  believe  that  the 
main  obstacles  to  East·We.c;;t 
trade  were  political.  Some  of 
them were. Europe  was  divided 
into  two  hostile  camps.  each 
tuspici<>us of the other and each 
concerned  largely  with  its  own 
inner  problems. 
On  both  sides  there  were 
people who opposed any signiti· 
cant increase in  trade, and were 
afr~id  o.f  too  much  economic 
interdependence.  In  the  West 
there  were  strategic embargoes 
on many  goods, and  ~uspicions 
that  trade  could  help  to  con-
'olidate  hostile  and  tvrannical 
regimes.  In  the East there  was 
a  tendency  to  believe  that  a 
properly  run  socialist  family 
under  the  wing  of  mother 
Russia  should  be  able  to 
manage largely on its own. 
Some  planners  resented 
having  to  adjust  their  tidy  sys-
tems  to  the  vagaries  -of  the 
capitalist markets, espedaHy as 
this  meant  an  erosion  of poH· 
tical control  over the economy. 
The Oommon Market \\as  ~een 
as a  political  as well as an eco· 
nomic threat. and hostility to  it 
became official  policy. 
In  spite  of  all  these  diffi-
culties  and  suspicions,  East-
West  trade did develop, and as 
political  tension  lessened  tl1ere 
were  hopes  that it  would  deve· 
lop  fa~ter.  General  de  Gaulle 
spread visions of a  new Europe 
stretching  from  the  Atlantic  to 
the  Urals. and  offered  trade as 
one  of its  pnzes. 
More  recently.  West  Ger-
many's  new  eastern  policy 
raised  hopes  of  a  great  leap 
forward  in  East-West  trade. 
Some  western  businessmen 
dreamed  of  making  dramatic 
break!.  into  the  relatively  un· 
developed  h1arkets  of  Eastern 
Europe.  Some  East European 
planners  and  economi.'>ts  ca.me 
to  believe  that  only  mass:Jve 
imports  of  western  machi.ne·ry 
a.nd  skill  could modernize their 
industl"ies,  stimulate  com.peti· 
tion  among  their  monopolies. 
and provide consumer goods as 
incentives  for  impatient  \\Or· 
kers. 
Ho·pes  on both sides are now 
more modest as people come to 
see that the pro.blems are nwre 
complex.  PoLitical  agreements 
and  pious  words by politicians 
are useful as far as they go but 
they cannot remove at a  stroke 
the  complex  web  of  political 
and economic o:bstacles to East-
West tflade that b.as been woven 
over many  year~. 
After the Second World War 
the  traditional  trading  paHerns 
of  Europe  were  broken.  East 
Europe  turned  towards  Russ.ia 
and  became  dependent on  her 
for  raw  materiah  and  in  part 
as  a  market  for  jndustrial 
goods.  It \\as a  relatively  easy 
market whkh  offered  no grmt 
stimulus  for  impro,·ements  in 
quality  and  thus  fell  increas-
ingly  behind  that  of  Western 
~.urope. 
At the same time there  were 
f>.bvious  di ff.iculties  in  trying 
to  develop  trading  relat-ion!'~ 
between  different systems.  The 
planned  economies  of  Eastern 
Eur-ope only gradually adjuSited 
themselves  :o  doin 
owi th  western  firms. 
bureaucracies  erecte 
rable  barrier-.  betwc 
eN  and  their  clier 
wa~ low. and  price.'i 
relation  to  co~ts 
market. 
Much  ot Lhb  ba~ 
recent  )'Cars.  More 
enterprise~  in  East< 
are  being  given  pe 
conduct direct negot 
weste.rn customers, t 
Poland and Hungar 
ment o.ffice3 a.re •bee, 
flexible  and  realistr 
is improving.  s:uspic 
ing. an·d the Commo 
coming to be accept· 
H.ty. 
But  e;ven  ..  .-hen  p 
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